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i
Abstract: This thesis examines the relationship between income, inequality and the wel-
fare state. Majority voting models explaining how income inequality affects the size of the
welfare state suffer from mixed empirical evidence. It is shown, that the positive correlation
between voter turnout in elections and socio-economic status is not the driving factor of this
drawback. This thesis shows that it comes more from the fact that individuals hold biased
perceptions of income inequality and social mobility. In addition, this thesis takes a look
at the bottom end of the income distribution, and shows that (some) personality traits and
unemployment are related.
Keywords: Income distribution, Welfare state, Misperceptions of inequality, Noncognitive
skills.
Kurzzusammenfassung: Diese Dissertation untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen
Einkommen, Einkommensungleichheit und dem Wohlfahrtsstaat. Medianwählermod-
elle, welche den Effekt von Einkommensungleichheit auf das Ausmaß der staatlichen
Umverteilung erklären, können empirisch nicht eindeutig bestätigt (oder abgelehnt) werden.
Hier wird gezeigt, dass die - oft angeführte - positive Korrelation zwischen der Wahlbeteili-
gung bei Bundestagswahlen und dem sozioökonomischen Status nicht dafür verantwortlich
gemacht werden kann. Eine wesentliche Rolle spielt allerdings, dass die Indivduen eine
verzerrte Wahrnehmung von der Einkommensungleichheit und der sozialen Mobilität haben.
Zusätzlich wirft diese Dissertation einen genaueren Blick auf den unteren Rand der Einkom-
mensverteilung und findet eine Zusammenhang zwischen Persönlichkeitsmerkmalen und Ar-
beitslosigkeit.
Schlagwörter: Einkommensverteilung, Wohlfahrtsstaat, Verzerrte Wahrnehmung der Un-
gleichheit, Nicht-kognitive Fähigkeiten.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and summary of basic results
The welfare state is a concept of government which is widespread in democratic countries.
It aim is to ensure the economic and social well-being of its citizens. But - despite the fact
that inequality aversion and the appreciation of equality of opportunity are pronounced in
most societies - the relationship between income inequality and the size of the welfare state
is puzzling (Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
The base model in political economy is the Meltzer-Richard-Model proposed by Meltzer and
Richard (1981) and Romer (1975). It predicts that greater inequality leads to higher levels
of redistribution in a majority-voting equilibrium. This means that the size of government is
determined by the relative position of the political decisive agent (here: median voter) in the
income scale. If the median voter earns a gross income below mean gross income she will
gain from redistribution. The higher the distance between median gross income and mean
gross income, the more the median voter will gain from redistribution and, consequently,
the more she will demand for redistribution. The empirical evidence of the theoretically
convincing framework is mixed. Some studies find a positive link, some find a negative
relation, and other find no significant link at all. The first part of this thesis aims to find a
reason for the ambiguous empirical evidence for this theoretical framework.
Chapter 2 starts with the observation that voter turnout and socio-economic status are corre-
lated (DeNardo, 1980; Mueller and Stratmann, 2003; Powell Jr., 1980; Verba and Nie, 1972;
Verba et al., 1978). If the relative position of the (decisive) median income changes when
concentrating the analysis on voters, policy outcomes might be biased in favor of citizens
with higher socio-economic status. Blais (2000) indeed shows that the median income of
voters is higher than the median income of the share of population eligible to vote in the US.
In a majority-voting equilibrium this would result in a lower level of redistribution compared
to an election which gives the same weight to all citizens. In Chapter 2 the voters’ income
distribution is compared to the distribution of incomes in the overall German society. Both
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income distributions are calculated on base of the German Socio-Economic Panel (G-SOEP)
2013. Of course, it will only make a difference using the overall income distribution or
voters’ income distribution in political economy models if there is a difference in crucial
parameters. Although voter turnout in the 2013 general election to the German Bundestag
differed considerably across income brackets, the income distribution of voters did not dif-
fer, in a statistically significant way, from that of the entire population. The non-uniform
turnout, thus, is unlikely to affect the political support for, or the feasibility of, policies that
are sensitive with respect to the income distribution. All in all, the positive correlation be-
tween voter turnout and socio-economic status cannot explain the mixed empirical evidence
of the Meltzer-Richard-Model. Thus, further investigations are required.
The empirical literature on income inequality and the size of the welfare state differ in the
inequality measures used. But what all have in common is that it is assumed that income
inequality is known by the citizens. Chapter 3 challenges the validity of this assumption.
There is evidence that individuals hold erroneous beliefs about distributions of outcomes in
general. Typically, they underestimate the range of outcomes and consider their relative rank
to be better than it really is. If this can be applied to income inequality and individuals own
income rank, less redistribution should emerge in a majority voting equilibrium if prefer-
ences for redistribution are based on perceived income inequality and not on factual income
inequality. This may lead to a different assessment of the validity of the Meltzer-Richard
hypothesis. Existing measures of perceived inequalities (used by political and social sci-
entiests) do not take into account potential biases from incorrect self-positioning. But in a
majority-voting equlibrium the bias from incorrect self-positioning is the most important fac-
tor. Therefore, a new measure of perceived inequality is designed in Chapter 3. It is shown
that the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis works quite well empirically, if based on this perceived
income distributions rather than on objective ones.
The Prospect of Upward Mobility (POUM) hypothesis is a comprehensive extension of the
Meltzer-Richard framework. Chapter 3 ends with applying the idea that perceptions (of
upward mobility) rather than facts drive redistributive politics to the POUM framework.
Again, regressions using perceptions perform better then regressions relying on factual data.
Overall, observations suggest that political preferences and choices might depend more on
perceptions than on facts and data.
Insights provided by Chapter 3 encourage to learn more about perceptions of inequality in
Germany. Chapter 4 presents a survey experiment which asks what Germans think and know
about inequality. The survey studies 1100 representative households in Germany in 2015.
Respondents’ preferences for redistribution, their average household income per month, their
perceptions of their own income rank within the German income distribution and their per-
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ceptions and preferences of social stratification in general were requested. The treatment
group was informed about the income distribution, repondents’ actual relative position and
the self-positioning bias before they were asked to state their preferences again. The aim
was to test whether confronting agents’ biased perceptions with accurate information have
a significant effect on their stated preferences. As Chapter 4 shows, Germans are unable to
assess their own position in the income distribution of their country and do not know much
about income inequality and stratification. They are well aware of their ignorance. Germans
would prefer society to be more egalitarian than they perceive it. Providing accurate infor-
mation about the income distribution does not change this preference for more redistribution
– except among those who learn that they are net contributors in the German tax-transfer
system.
The first part of this thesis focuses on the overall income distribution and the size of the
welfare state. The second (and last) part shifts the focus away from the overall income distri-
bution towards the very bottom of the income distribution. Chapter 5 studies the relationship
between unemployment and unemployment benefits on the one hand and noncognitive skills
on the other hand. Empirical evidence suggests that labor markets give an advantage to in-
dividuals with high levels of the Big Five dimensions conscientiousness and agreeableness
(Cuesta and Budría, 2017; Egan et al., 2017; Fletcher, 2013). Less conscious and agreeable
individuals need to make more effort to find and keep a suitable employment. The question
is whether the existence of the welfare state decreases the extrinsic motivation for taking this
effort. In this case, the welfare state would systematically lower the inhibition threshold of
being unemployed. Using the G-SOEP, Chapter 5 shows that - in Germany - unemployment
and both personality traits are indeed related. Individuals with low scores in the Big Five
dimensions conscientiousness and agreeableness have a higher probability of being unem-
ployed, have longer unemployment durations, and experience more status changes between
employment and unemployment. Results suggests that personality is an important deter-
minant of women’s risk of unemployment, but for men personality is more a matter of job
keeping.
1.2 Structure
This thesis consists of five chapters which examine the relationship between income, in-
equality and the welfare state from different empirical perspectives.
Chapter 2 is co-authored with Andreas Wagener, Institute of Economic Policy, University of
Hannover. An earlier version of this chapter is available as Discussion Paper No. 586 of the
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Hannover Economic Papers series.
Chapter 3 is co-authored with Andreas Wagener, Institute of Economic Policy, University
of Hannover. An earlier version of this chapter is available as CESifo Working Paper No.
4838. It was presented at the Conference on Public Economics of Inequality (Berlin, Ger-
many), the 70th Annnual Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (Lugano,
Switzerland), and the 6th Society for the Study of Economic Inequality Meeting (Luxem-
bourg, Luxembourg). A poster summarizing this chapter was presented at Herrenhausen
Conference "Re-Thinking Social Inequality" (Hannover, Germany).
Chapter 4 is co-authored with Andreas Wagener, Institute of Economic Policy, University of
Hannover. This chapter is forthcoming in the Socio-Economic Review and is available via
https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwx036. Publication within this thesis with kind permission of
Oxford University Press. An earlier version of this chapter is available as ECINEQ Working
Paper 2016 - 389.
This thesis ends with Chapter 5. An earlier version of this chapter is available as Discussion
Paper No. 621 of the Hannover Economic Papers series.
4
2 The income distribution of
voters: a case study from
Germany1
2.1 Introduction
In most democratic countries, voter turnout in elections and socio-economic status are pos-
itively correlated: individuals with higher incomes, greater wealth and better education are
significantly more likely to cast their vote than less advantaged citizens (DeNardo, 1980;
Gallego, 2010; Mueller and Stratmann, 2003; Powell Jr., 1980; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba
et al., 1978). This stylized fact calls into question the democratic ideal that all citizens have
equal weight in the polity: systematic differences in the participation in elections across
socio-economic groups may result in inequalities in representation and influence (Lijphart,
1997), potentially biasing policy outcomes in favor of more privileged citizens and against
the interests of low socio-economic status individuals.
In fact, prominent models in political economy posit a link between participation in elections
and policies. Median voter approaches, for example, predict that government expenditures,
progressive taxation or redistribution in a democracy vary with the gap between the income
of the median voter and the mean income in the population (Meltzer and Richard, 1981)
or, more generally, with the concentration of incomes around the mean (Acemoglu et al.,
2015). If – for example, due to differential participation in elections – the median voter
shifts towards poorer [richer] segments of society, redistribution increases [is reduced].
Numerous empirical studies try to identify the relationship between voter turnout and
distribution-sensitive policy variables such as post-tax inequality, the amount of redistri-
bution or the size of the government (Galbraith and Hale, 2008; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011;
1This chapter is co-authored with Andreas Wagener, Institute of Economic Policy, University of Hannover.
An earlier version of this chapter is available as Discussion Paper No. 586 of the Hannover Economic
Papers series.
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Mahler, 2008; Mahler et al., 2014; Pontusson and Rueda, 2010; Rosema, 2007; Solt, 2010).
Some studies run multiple-election regressions, relating turnout to policy outcomes. Other
studies use (cross-sample) questionnaires to simulate individual and/or aggregate candidate
or party choices that might have arisen with a higher or more uniform turnout (Lutz and
Marsh, 2007). With either approach and notwithstanding some observations suggesting that
a higher voter turnout goes along with a larger volume of government activities (Fumagalli
and Narciso, 2012; Mueller and Stratmann, 2003), the overall evidence is mixed, inconsis-
tent or weak (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2015; Lutz and Marsh, 2007; Petterson and Rose,
2007; Rosema, 2007).
The lack of robust findings may indicate that, in the aggregate, voters and the general pop-
ulation (and, by implication, non-voters) actually do not differ that much from one another.
In this note, we provide a small piece of evidence into that direction. Using the 2013 general
election to the German Bundestag (the federal parliament in Germany) as an example, we
compare the distribution of incomes among (self-reported) voters with the income distribu-
tion in the entire franchised population. In that election, as in many others, participation rates
were monotonically increasing in income, suggesting a pro-rich, anti-poor bias for eventual
policies. Still, the (normal and generalized) Lorenz curves as well as related inequality mea-
sures for the income distributions of voters and the population do not differ in a statistically
significant way. To the extent that the income distribution in the population matters for actual
policies, we do not detect any hint that the non-uniform election turnout distorts the majority
will of society.
2.2 Population, voters and turnout
The calculation of income distributions is based on the 2013 wave of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (G-SOEP). We use monthly net incomes (on household level), measured
in Euro values of 2013 and equivalised according to the modified OECD scale. The G-
SOEP is representative for the German income distribution up to the top one percent but
lacks information on individuals at the very top (Jenderny and Bartels, 2015). Thus, we
dropped the highest percentile and assume that 99%-percentile is the upper bound of the
distribution. This truncation does not change results qualitatively (and even quantitative
changes in differences are small).2
From the G-SOEP v31 sample, we select all 22,735 individuals, aged 18 or older, who
2As we ignore the top one percent and our calculation of inequality measures is based on classed data, our
observations are conservative.
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provided information on their incomes and did not belong to the top one percent of income
earners. By the ‘general income distribution’ we denote the income distribution of this G-
SOEP population, for brevity henceforth referred to as ‘the population’. We compare the
general income distribution to that of voters.3
As ‘voters’ we refer to everybody in the population who said that they had voted in the 2013
Bundestag election. G-SOEP v31 contained a question on participation in the election. A
total of 15,520 respondents answered it, with 12,994 (= 83.72%) claiming that they actually
had voted. This turnout among respondents is higher than the official turnout of 71.5%,
reflecting the well-known feature that voting is overestimated in population surveys with
self-reporting (Blais, 2000).
In what follows, we collapse data from the individual level to the vingtile level (see Sec-
tion 2.4 for results based on the individual level). Table 2.1 reports turnout rates in the 2013
election to Bundestag by vingtile as well as the number of respondents answering the elec-
tion question (the Nrespondents sum up to 15,520). In line with observations from many other
elections around the world, turnout rates do indeed increase with income.
Table 2.1: Voter turnout by vingtile (election to Bundestag, 2013)
vingtile voter turnout Nrespondents vingtile voter turnout Nrespondents
5% 0.615 569 55% 0.867 481
10% 0.658 730 60% 0.869 960
15% 0.683 543 65% 0.880 851
20% 0.745 891 70% 0.897 631
25% 0.752 418 75% 0.872 757
30% 0.738 768 80% 0.905 958
35% 0.825 830 85% 0.922 936
40% 0.820 1106 90% 0.932 876
45% 0.827 579 95% 0.937 933
50% 0.851 851 100% 0.947 852
We compare the income distributions (in vingtiles) of the population and of voters. For each
vingtile we calculate the vingtile mean, based on the general income distribution. In the
general income distribution, all vingtiles naturally have the same sample weight of 120 ; for
the voters’ income distribution, sample weights are the probability to draw a certain income
3Rather than the general income distribution one might prefer to use the income distribution of the electorate
as a baseline. In Bundestag elections, every German citizen aged 18 years or more is eligible to vote
(with very few exceptions for long-term non-residents). The G-SOEP asked about citizenship, but 8%
of the respondents chose not to answer this question, leaving us with some imprecision when identifying
the electorate. As a robustness check (available on request), we ran our analysis using (self-reported)
German citizens as the population. This does not change our results qualitatively – and even the quantitative
differences are quite tiny.
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under the condition that it belongs to a voter. By Bayes’ Rule,
P(Vingtilei|Voter) = P(Voter|Vingtilei) ·P(Vingtilei)P(Voter) =
1
20
· turnout in vingtile i
overall turnout
for i = 1, . . . ,20. We report these weights in column ‘weight voter’ in Table 2.A1.
2.3 Comparing general and voters’ income
distributions
2.3.1 Means, medians and their ratios
Table 2.2 reports the mean incomes, the median incomes (both in Euro) and the mean-to-
median ratios for the population’s and the voters’ income distribution. The latter ratio plays
a crucial role for the predictions in median-voter frameworks of (direct) democracy such as
Meltzer and Richard (1981).
Table 2.2: Various mean-to-median ratios
mean income, general 1719
median income, general 1507
mean-to-median ratio, general 1.141
mean income, voters 1804
median income, voters 1573
mean-to-median ratio, voters 1.147
Incomes in Euro. Source: Own calculations for 2013 based on SOEP v31.
On average, voters have higher incomes than the population. The difference in mean incomes
is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-test). The (positive) difference in median incomes
is, however, not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test). The ratio between the incomes
of the average income earner and the median does not differ between voters and the popu-
lation either, implying, for this example, that a majority voting equilibrium in the model by
Meltzer and Richard (1981) and its kindred would not be affected by income-differentiated
turnouts.
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2.3.2 Lorenz curves
The gap between mean and median incomes is a non-standard measure of income inequality.
Common measures build on Lorenz curves. We therefore estimated Lorenz curves using
linear interpolations within vingtiles, as proposed by Jann (2016). Estimation using sample
survey data means that estimates reflect sampling variability. As Lorenz curves and other
inequality measures are nonlinear functions of the observations, conventional methods for
variance estimation cannot be applied (Kovacevic and Binder, 1997). Instead approximate
(linear) estimation techniques can be used (Jann, 2016).
Graphs of the estimated Lorenz curves are presented in Figure 2.1. Estimated Lorenz curves
and corresponding 95% confidence intervals are presented in Figure 2.A1 in the Appendix.
Figure 2.1: Lorenz curves, voters and general.
Though a bit difficult to visualize, the estimated Lorenz curve for voters’ incomes entirely
lies above of that of the population. Due to their overlapping confidence intervals (see Fig-
ure 2.A1) we still cannot rank the two distributions with respect to the criterion of Lorenz
dominance in a statistically reliable way.
Despite the unequal means in the income distributions of voters and the population, the
same holds for the Generalized Lorenz curves: neither distribution dominates the other; see
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Table 2.A2 in the Appendix. In summary, no clear-cut inequality ranking of voters and the
population is possible.
2.3.3 Inequality measures
Various inequality measures are transformations of the Lorenz curve, allowing for restricted
inequality comparisons even when Lorenz dominance does not prevail. Table 2.3 compares
some measures for voters and the general German population in 2013.
Table 2.3: Comparison of different inequality measures
voters general
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Gini coefficient 0.270 0.041 0.276 0.042
GE(−1): Gen. entropy with α =−1 0.133 0.045 0.140 0.047
GE(0): Mean log deviation 0.119 0.036 0.124 0.038
GE(1): Theil index 0.118 0.036 0.125 0.038
GE(2): half std. dev./mean 0.131 0.043 0.139 0.046
Atkinson index with ε = 0.5 0.058 0.017 0.060 0.018
Atkinson index with ε = 1 0.112 0.032 0.117 0.034
Atkinson index with ε = 2 0.210 0.056 0.218 0.058
GE(α) denotes the Generalized Entropy index with distance weight α; ε denotes the parameter of inequality
aversion in the Atkinson index. Source: Own calculations for 2013 based on SOEP v31.
While all point measures suggest that inequality is lower among voters than in the general
population, none of these differences is statistically significant (we applied t-tests, as recom-
mended by Cowell and Flachaire (2015)). In sum, we do not detect statistically significant
differences between the general income distribution and the distribution of voters’ incomes.
2.4 Robustness check: individual-level data
As an alternative to using vingtile-level sample weights for approximating the income dis-
tribution of voters we also calculated the distribution based on individual-level data. In the
voter sample, individuals are weighed such that the share of every income vingtile equals
the actual share of voters from our sample in that vingtile. Changing from vingtiles to indi-
vidual observations increases the number of observations drastically, causing the estimated
variances of coefficients to decrease correspondingly. Again, we truncate the distribution at
the top percentile.
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Lorenz curves of voters and the population are presented in Figure 2.2. Again, one cannot
rank the two distributions with respect to Lorenz dominance.
Figure 2.2: Both Lorenz curves (individual-level weights).
Table 2.A3 in the Appendix reports the means, the medians and their ratio in the income
distributions of population and voters.4 The differences in the mean and median incomes
between voters’ and the population are nearly the same. The difference in mean incomes is
statistically highly significant at the 1%-level.
Remarkably, the mean income in the population and the median voter’s income is close to
parity – which, in the Meltzer-Richard framework, would indicate that there is no majority
support for (additional) redistribution.
Table 2.A4 reports inequality measures; it is the individual-level equivalent to Table 2.3.
Again, none of the differences in inequality measures is statistically significant different
from zero.
All in all, also with individual-level data we do not find statistically significant differences
between voters’ and the population’s income distributions or their inequality measures.
4The differences between Table 2.A3 and Table 2.2 in the values for the total population are due to the fact
that values in Table 2.2 refer to vingtile mean incomes and not to individual-level data.
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2.5 Conclusions
Differences in turnout across socio-economic groups may be problematic for the democratic
legitimacy and representativeness of parliaments and governments. However, differential
turnouts do not necessarily matter materially in the sense that election outcomes or imple-
mented policies would be different with more uniform participation. Recent evidence seems
to point precisely into such direction of ‘irrelevance’ (Rosema, 2007).
This note adds a piece of evidence from Germany. Although prima facie looking different,
the income distributions of voters and the population in the 2013 federal elections do not
differ in a statistically significant way. Provided that the income distribution in the entire
population matters for actual policies, we do not find any indication that the election turnout
distorts the ‘true’ majority will of society.
Several caveats must be mentioned. We studied just one election in Germany, limiting the
generality of our observation. We only looked at differences in the distributions of incomes
between voters and non-voters. All potential implications for (counter-factual) policy out-
comes thus, depend, on how politically relevant citizens’ incomes or their inequality are.
The (ir-)relevance of other characteristics (such as education, ethnicity, ideology, age etc.)
also needs to be scrutinized. We implicitly hypothesized that turnout shapes policies; the
causality might, however, also run the other way round. Finally, as suffrage in German fed-
eral elections is for German citizens only, the income distribution in the population need not
fully reflect that of the entire society.
12
2 The income distribution of voters
2.6 Appendix
Table 2.A1: Comparison of sample weights
vingtile mean income equal weight cum. equal weight weight voter cum. weight voter
1 530 0.05 0.05 0.037 0.037
2 753 0.05 0.1 0.040 0.077
3 863 0.05 0.15 0.041 0.118
4 971 0.05 0.2 0.045 0.163
5 1047 0.05 0.25 0.045 0.209
6 1122 0.05 0.3 0.045 0.253
7 1210 0.05 0.35 0.050 0.303
8 1308 0.05 0.4 0.050 0.353
9 1385 0.05 0.45 0.050 0.403
10 1475 0.05 0.5 0.051 0.454
11 1539 0.05 0.55 0.052 0.507
12 1632 0.05 0.6 0.053 0.559
13 1755 0.05 0.65 0.053 0.612
14 1883 0.05 0.7 0.054 0.667
15 1995 0.05 0.75 0.053 0.719
16 2153 0.05 0.8 0.055 0.774
17 2398 0.05 0.85 0.056 0.830
18 2703 0.05 0.9 0.056 0.886
19 3192 0.05 0.95 0.057 0.943
20 4451 0.05 1 0.057 1.000
Notes: A χ2-test for equality of distributions shows no statistically significant difference between the
distribution of weight_voter and the uniform distribution with weight 1/20 of each vingtile.
Table 2.A2: Estimated Generalized Lorenz curves
general voters
pop. share Coeff. Std. Err. 95% Conf. Int. Coeff. Std. Err. 95% Conf. Int.
0 0 . . . 0 . . .
5 26.5397 . . . 29.3999 6.7228 15.3289 43.4709
10 64.2332 11.1538 40.8879 87.5784 69.6233 11.1865 46.2097 93.0369
15 107.4157 17.2482 71.3148 143.5166 116.2165 17.2306 80.1525 152.2805
20 155.9684 24.2403 105.2329 206.7039 167.5603 22.6161 120.2243 214.8964
25 208.3219 29.6825 146.1958 270.4480 223.0201 28.1504 164.1006 281.9395
30 264.4397 35.4211 190.3025 338.5770 283.2631 34.6139 210.8153 355.7109
35 324.9795 42.5679 235.8838 414.0752 348.3770 42.3294 259.7805 436.9736
40 390.4091 50.8690 283.9390 496.8792 417.4500 48.7904 315.3304 519.5695
45 459.6981 57.5450 339.2551 580.1411 490.9689 56.1422 373.4619 608.4759
50 533.4673 65.3167 396.7579 670.1767 567.6647 61.5373 438.8658 696.4637
55 610.4341 70.7636 462.3242 758.5440 648.6669 68.7747 504.7198 792.6141
60 692.0553 78.4977 527.7579 856.3528 735.2957 78.2701 571.4746 899.1169
65 779.8107 88.5245 594.5269 965.0945 827.8926 88.3864 642.8978 1012.8870
70 874.0009 98.7249 667.3673 1080.6340 925.8082 97.4201 721.9056 1129.7110
75 973.7691 107.0080 749.7988 1197.390 1030.4230 107.8508 804.6886 1256.1570
80 1081.4360 117.7713 834.9375 1327.9340 1144.4600 122.3115 888.4592 1400.4610
85 1201.3680 132.9974 923.0009 1479.7340 1270.5560 140.1038 977.3152 1563.7970
90 1336.5320 149.4641 1023.7000 1649.3640 1412.5220 163.6479 1070.0030 1755.0410
95 1496.1790 170.6649 1138.9730 1853.3840 1581.2920 217.1728 1126.7440 2035.8400
100 1718.7570 208.0124 1283.3820 2154.1320 1803.8700 217.1728 1349.3220 2258.4180
13
2 The income distribution of voters
Figure 2.A1: Both Lorenz curves with 95% confidence intervalls.
Table 2.A3: Mean-to-median ratios (indi-
vidual data)
mean income, general 1715
median income, general 1500
mean-to-median ratio, general 1.143
mean income, voters 1800
median income, voters 1565
mean-to-median ratio, voters 1.150
Source: Own calculations for 2013 based on SOEP v31.
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Table 2.A4: Inequality measures (individual-level data)
voters general
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Gini coefficient 0.270 0.0013 0.276 0.0014
GE(−1): Gen. entropy with α =−1 0.136 0.0015 0.144 0.0016
GE(0): Mean log deviation 0.119 0.0012 0.125 0.0012
GE(1): Theil index 0.119 0.0012 0.125 0.0013
Atkinson index with ε = 0.5 0.058 0.0006 0.061 0.0006
Atkinson index with ε = 1 0.113 0.0010 0.118 0.0011
Atkinson index with ε = 2 0.214 0.0019 0.223 0.0020
GE(α) denotes the Generalized Entropy index with distance weight α; ε denotes the parameter of inequality
aversion in the Atkinson index. Source: Own calculations for 2013 based on SOEP v31.
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3 Biased perceptions of income
inequality and redistribution1
3.1 Introduction
The relationship between income inequality and redistribution in democracies is puzzling
(Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). The seminal political-
economy approach by Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Romer (1975) predicts that greater
inequality in the distribution of gross incomes leads to higher levels of redistribution in a
majority-voting equilibrium. Higher levels of inequality – measured by the ratio of mean
gross income to median gross income – imply that the politically decisive agents can gain
more from, and consequently will demand for, more redistribution.
While theoretically convincing, the empirical performance of this prediction is mixed, at best
(see Section 2). Given that the Meltzer-Richard (henceforth: MR) model entails a long chain
of logical steps from the ex-ante inequality in incomes to the extent of redistribution in a
political equilibrium, this need not be surprising. The logical steps encompass the validity of
the median voter hypothesis (actual policies are the median voter’s most preferred policy),
the identity of median voter and median income earner, a purely materialistic and selfish
attitude towards redistribution in a static framework, a direct link from voter preferences to
policies, etc.
This paper suggests a complementary explanation why empirical tests of the MR hypothesis
often appear to be inconclusive or negative: they use objective income distributions rather
than perceived ones. ‘Objective’ refers to official data, which are meant to give a statistically
accurate description of a country’s income distribution; ‘perceived’ refers to how individu-
als view the income distribution and their position in it. There is ample of evidence – and
we provide a further piece, too – that individuals hold erroneous beliefs about income in-
1This chapter is co-authored with Andreas Wagener, Institute of Economic Policy, University of Hannover.
An earlier version of this chapter is available as CESifo Working Paper No. 4838. It was presented at
conferences in Germany, Switzerland, and Luxembourg.
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equality in their societies, typically underestimate its extent and consider themselves to be
relatively richer than they really are (see Section 3.2). If preferences for redistribution are
based on perceived income inequality, less redistribution should emerge in a majority voting
equilibrium, compared to the equilibrium predicted from the true income distribution. More-
over, since misperceptions of income inequality might differ across countries, the inequality
ranking of countries based on perceived distributions may differ from that based on true data.
The idea that perceptions rather than facts and data drive redistributive politics is not re-
stricted to the MR hypothesis but can also be applied to other theories. A particularly fruitful
extension of the MR framework is provided by the Prospect of Upward Mobility (POUM)
hypothesis. It posits that people with below average incomes today might not support redis-
tribution from rich to poor because they hope that they or their children will move upward
on the economic ladder in the future where a more progressive tax system will hurt them
(Benabou and Ok, 2001). It is well established that citizens hold distorted (generally: too
optimistic) expectations of (their) upward social mobility (Bjoernskov et al., 2013). Political
preferences and policies formulated on the ground of these expectations will then differ from
those based on factual data.
In this paper we assess the MR hypothesis when based on perceptions of inequality. We
use survey data from various waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)
where individuals are asked to locate their own position in society on a range between 1
(poorest) and 10 (richest). From these self-assessments of relative positions we construct a
perceived distribution of incomes with an attending mean-to-median ratio. It turns out that
these perceived ratios are, for all countries and in all years of our sample, considerably below
their true values, indicating a widespread underestimation of income inequality. Employing
perceived inequality measures as explanatory variables for social expenditure, the MR hy-
pothesis works fine empirically: a larger degree of perceived inequality goes along with a
greater amount of redistribution, measured by social spending as a percentage of GDP. This
observation survives all robustness checks to which we took it. Moreover, in international
comparison, the stronger the misjudgment, i.e., the more benign the inequality situation in a
country is viewed relative to the objective one, the lower are social expenditures.
In addition, we test a ‘perceived version’ of the POUM hypothesis. We rely on the ISSP
question that asks individuals how important, on a range from 1 to 5, they find hard work
to get ahead. In line with the literature we interpret the assignment of a greater importance
to hard work as an indicator for a higher perceived social mobility. As a factual measure of
upward social mobility we use the share of people in the ISSP who report that they actually
are in higher occupations than their fathers. Regressing social expenditure on perceived and
actual upward mobility, the former performs much better than the latter, both with respect to
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the sign of the effect and its statistical significance.
Section 3.2 embeds our study into the extant literature. Section 3.3 presents our analysis
of the MR hypothesis, describing data and methodology, results, and robustness checks.
Section 3.4 does the same for the POUM hypothesis. Section 3.5 concludes. The Appendix
collects information on data sources, variable definitions, supplementary regressions and
robustness checks.
3.2 Related observations
Previous research by economists and political scientists tried to validate the Meltzer and
Richard (1981) model empirically. Due to obvious endogeneity problems, causal identifica-
tions of the MR hypothesis so far do not exist. Moreover, the evidence resulting from the
extant correlation studies is mixed. Some studies find the hypothesized positive link between
inequality and redistribution (see, e.g., Borge and Rattsoe, 2004; Finseraas, 2009; Mahler,
2008; Meltzer and Richard, 1983; Milanovic, 2000), while others suggest a negative rela-
tionship (e.g., Georgiadis and Manning, 2012; Gouveia and Masia, 1998; Rodrìguez, 1999)
or no significant link at all (e.g., Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Larcinese, 2007; Lindert,
1996; Pecoraro, 2014; Pontusson and Rueda, 2010; Scervini, 2012; Tóth et al., 2011).
Rather than actual redistributive policies (often measured by social expenditure in percent
of GDP), some studies correlate individual preferences (‘demand’) for redistribution with
income inequality (see, e.g., Finseraas, 2009; Georgiadis and Manning, 2012; Kenworthy
and McCall, 2008). For the MR hypothesis, the performance of such studies tends to be
better than that of social quota-studies, suggesting that individuals in more unequal societies
would like to see more redistribution. However, such stated preferences for redistribution
might be regarded as cheap-talk; the link between voter preferences to actually implemented
policies is still lacking. We therefore prefer to use policy outcomes as the dependent variable
in a direct test of the MR hypothesis.
The studies differ in how they measure income inequality: by the ratio of mean to median
income, the Gini coefficient, the income share of the 1% richest etc. However, almost all of
studies (for exceptions, see below) evaluate the inequality measures they use with ‘objective’
data of the income distribution, obtained from statistical offices, the OECD, the LIS, or tax
authorities. While factually accurate, these data and the picture of inequality they portray
need not coincide with how citizens and voters themselves perceive the income distribution.
There are good reasons to assume that citizens hold distorted views on inequality. Experi-
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ments show that respondents fail to determine their own position in the income scale (Cruces
et al., 2013; Engelhardt and Wagener, 2017; Karadja et al., 2017). Furthermore, they under-
estimate income inequality per se. Norton and Ariely (2011) observe considerable discrep-
ancies between actual and perceived levels of inequality in wealth in the US: citizens view
the wealth distribution vastly more equal than it actually is. Similarly, Osberg and Smeeding
(2006) show that estimated disparities between the earnings of different occupational groups
are much smaller than actual differences, suggesting again an underestimation of income
inequality. Bartels (2005, 2008) argues that knowledge about inequality in the U.S. is not
only low but also shaped by political ideology, with conservatives [liberals] being less [more]
aware of the rising inequality, even after controlling for their level of general political knowl-
edge. Using a variety of cross-national surveys, Gimpelson and Treisman (2015) show that
the general public knows quite little about inequality in their countries. As a tendency, there
seems to be an underestimation of wage inequality while income inequality and poverty are
overrated.
Sociologists have since long established that individuals systematically underestimate the
extent of inequality. This occurs mainly due to the failure to locate their own position
in the income distribution (also see, e.g., Engelhardt and Wagener, 2017; Gimpelson and
Treisman, 2015, and Section 3.3.3 below). Several reasons may account for such incorrect
self-positioning, ranging from limited availability of social comparisons – which leads indi-
viduals to falsely believe that they are close to the average income earner (Evans and Kelley,
2004; Runciman, 1966) – to so-called self-enhancement biases – individuals are inclined to
see their own (income) position rosier and relatively better than it actually is (generally see,
e.g., Guenther and Alicke, 2010). Such misperceptions generally invoke an underestimation
of (income) inequality.
Inequality is not the only economically relevant variable that is subject to biased percep-
tions. For the public sphere, divergences between subjective perceptions and more objective
measures have been observed in the very different contexts of inflation (Gärling and Gam-
ble, 2008), general economic performance (Duch et al., 2000), corruption (Olken, 2009), tax
rates (Fujii and Hawley, 1988), teacher performance (Jacob and Lefgren, 2008), and social
mobility (Bjoernskov et al., 2013); on the latter, see our discussion of the POUM hypothesis
in Section 3.4.
Systematic misperceptions matter for voting. Conceptually, theories of (economic) voting
depend on the notion of voters’ perceived state of the world, rather than on any ‘true’ or mea-
sured state (Stevenson and Duch, 2013). Empirically, voters’ perceived states of the world
are not simply zero-mean noise around some true state of the world (such that their effect
on votes would cancel out in the aggregate). Rather, they entail cognitive biases, salience
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issues, ideological preferences etc. that systematically distort away the distribution of ex-
pressed political preferences from the one that emerged with full and accurate knowledge
(Althaus, 1998; Bartels, 1996, 2008; Caplan, 2007).
In that spirit, a few studies on the political economy of redistribution have recently started
to substitute objective measures of inequality by perceived ones. Kenworthy and McCall
(2008) measure perceived inequality by the perceived relative wage difference between a
high-paying occupation and lesser-paying occupations, thus proxying decile ratios. In their
mainly explorative analysis, they do not find any relationship between (changes in) income
redistribution and (changes in) perceived inequality. A potential drawback of their measure
of perceived inequality is, however, that it does not take into account possible biases from an
incorrect self-positioning, which is an important driver of misperceptions. Niehues (2014)
looks at ISSP respondents’ beliefs about the type of society (out of five possible ones) they
are living. Types are visualized by pyramid- to rhomb-shaped graphs, representing the com-
position of strata in society. In countries where the composition is perceived to be of a lesser
equalized type the demand for redistribution is then found to be greater. Strikingly, when
comparing the respondents’ assessments of their country type with the ‘true’ type, inequality
is found to be overestimated in some European countries. Gimpelson and Treisman (2015)
show that measures of perceived inequality, calculated from the geometric visualizations
of types of income distributions in the ISSP, correlate much more strongly than measures
based on official data with the perceived tensions between rich and poor. Differences in find-
ings may be explained by the fact that Niehues (2014) and Gimpelson and Treisman (2015)
construct a measure of perceived inequality based on the chosen graphs representing social
stratification while we define a numerical measure mainly driven by a self-positioning bias.
This suspicion is also supported by Engelhardt and Wagener (2017). In this study a repre-
sentative sample of the german population were asked about their perception of their own
relative income rank and about the type of society which - in their opinion - best describes
the german society today. Respondents - on average - fail to locate their own position in the
income distribution. The pattern of bias found in the survey is similar to the pattern observed
in this study and to the pattern found by Cruces et al. (2013) suggesting an underestimation
of inequalty. But biases in social stratification perceptions go in the same direction as found
by Niehues (2014).
Bredemeier (2014) theoretically discusses determinants of rising inequality that can account
for a lower demand for redistribution. The paper argues that when the incomes of the poor
increase, perceived inequality decreases (even though the mean-to-median ratio might actu-
ally increase) and the demand for redistribution goes down. This theoretical result is in line
with our empirical observation that political outcomes based on expectations will differ from
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those based on factual data.
The POUM hypothesis has mainly been tested with respect to preferences for redistribution.
Corneo and Grüner (2002) show that the degrees both of perceived social mobility (based
on a ‘hard work’-question in social surveys) and of experienced social mobility (based on
the comparison to one’s father’s job) weaken the support for the statement that governments
should reduce inequalities. However, this is again more a statement on inequality aversion
than on political outcomes. The dependent variable in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) is more
specific (agreement with the statement that ‘the government should reduce income differ-
ences between the rich and the poor’). Interestingly, in this study all measures of perceived
social mobility are negatively correlated with the support of more redistribution, while most
measures of experienced upward mobility show no association with the desire for larger so-
cial spending. In Section 3.4 we will show that this also holds for actual (rather than desired)
redistribution.
3.3 The MR hypothesis and perceived inequality
3.3.1 Data and descriptive statistics
The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) is a continuous cross-national survey which
contains questions covering a variety of social science topics2 and it provides the best avail-
able comparative data on public opinion regarding inequality and redistribution (Brooks and
Manza, 2006; Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Lübker, 2006; Osberg and Smeeding, 2006).
Using the ISSP, we design a new measure of perceived inequality in the income distribution.
The measure is based on the following survey question:
‘In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups
which tend to be toward the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to
bottom (vertical scale (10 top – 1 bottom)). Where would you put yourself now
on this scale?’
Data on the answers are available for the years 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2006-2009 for 26
OECD countries covered on the ISSP.3 The ISSP does not include all 26 countries in each
wave. For some countries we just have one single observation. Thus, we decided to base
2See http://www.gesis.org/issp/home/ for more information about the ISSP.
3These are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, South Korea,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, and the US.
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our main analysis on cross-sectional data. This enables us to use information from all 26
countries. Table 3.A1 in the Appendix shows from which country in which wave all required
data are available. We will discuss the possibility of a pooled sample specification in Sec-
tion 3.3.3. Survey data from the ISSP exhibit a representative cross section of societies and
the calculated perceived inequality measures are based on information of 161,438 individuals
which respond to the top-bottom-question4.
The histograms (relative frequencies) for the average answers to the question quoted above
are depicted country-by-country in Figure 3.1. The distributions in Figure 3.1 exhibit a re-
markable degree of symmetry5 (sometimes even left-skewedness). Compared to the marked
right-skewedness of actual income distributions this suggests that the inequality situation is
systematically misperceived by the public. In line with the findings in Cruces et al. (2013)
and Engelhardt and Wagener (2017), poor people tend to overestimate their rank while rich
people tend to underestimate it.
We assume that self-assessments are mainly made in terms of income and, thus, provide an
approximation of the perceived position in the income distribution. To check whether re-
spondents of the ISSP question indeed associated somewhat loose terms such as ‘groups in
society’, ‘towards the top’ or ‘towards the bottom’ in accordance with their views on income
strata, we calculate the individual misperception of the own rank by subtracting a person’s
actual income decile from her perceived position. There is, in general, a strong positive
association between actual income position6 and perceived rank. As Table 3.1 shows addi-
tionally, individuals below the fifth decile tend to overestimate their rank while individuals
above the fifth decile tend to underestimate it. Respondents in the fifth decile quite accurately
positioned themselves at quantile 5.335 (5+ constant) on average. By contrast, respondents
in the third and seventh decile on average put themselves at, respectively, 4.927 and at 5.675.
As in Cruces et al. (2013), the severity of misjudgments increases with the distance to the
center of the distribution.
The hypothetical income distributions in Figure 3.1 are based on the aggregation of indi-
vidual and categorical data. They are, thus, not perceptions of the income distribution that
any specific individual in society holds but rather a summary view on how society catego-
rizes itself with respect to inequality. We can overlook this fact, because we are interested
4The number of oberservations in our cross-sectional data set ranges from 1,247 in Belgium to 10,960 in
Germany.
5We cannot exclude the possibility that the kind of question fosters this symmetric pattern of answers. The
answer categories may suggest a symmetric distribution of incomes. But, in political discussions concerning
income distributions a symmetric formulation is also usual (e.g. lower, middle, and upper class) with the -
potentially - same implication.
6For perceived own relative income it does not matter whether resondents think about net or gross incomes.
Progressive tax-transfer-systems in OECD countries are not excessive enough to change pattern of society.
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Table 3.1: Biases per income decile
Coeff. Std. Err.
1. decile 2.934*** 0.045
2. decile 2.280*** 0.045
3. decile 1.592*** 0.045
4. decile 0.739*** 0.045
5. decile reference
6. decile -0.852*** 0.045
7. decile -1.660*** 0.045
8. decile -2.459*** 0.045
9. decile -3.422*** 0.045
10. decile -4.97*** 0.046
constant 0.335*** 0.032
R2 0.6698
N 28401
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗∗∗p < 0.01,
∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Estimations are exemplary and fig-
ures are based on data from 2009. Results do not change
qualitatively if we use other years or cross-sectional data.
Data for Canada, Mexico, and the Netherlands are missing
here.
in validating the Meltzer-Richard Hypothesis. According to the MR hypothesis, the tax rate
most preferred by the median income earner will win the voting. The higher the median
perception of own relative income in society, the lower is the preferred tax rate and the less
redistribution will take place, compared to the voting outcome based on accurate knowledge.
To approximate the bias in perception, we compare the perceived mean-to-median ratio (the
ratio between the average and the median value of self-categorizations) and the actual one,
calculated from OECD statistics. Both are reported in Table 3.2. To capture the relative
degree of misperception we form the ratio of the perceived mean-to-median ratio and the
actual ratio. We call this measure the ‘weighted perception’ of income inequality:
weighted perception :=
mean-to-median (perceived)
mean-to-median (actual)
, (3.1)
which Table 3.2 reports as well.
Table 3.2 entails three remarkable observations:
• The actual mean-to-median ratios are uniformly greater than the perceived ones, in-
dicating that inequality is underestimated everywhere. Correspondingly, the measure
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Table 3.2: Mean-to-median ratio and misjudgment
official perceived weighted perception
Austria 1.116 1.065 0.954
Belgium 1.088 0.993 0.912
Canada 1.141 1.022 0.895
Chile 1.656 0.984 0.594
Czech Republic 1.132 1.076 0.951
Denmark 1.068 1.004 0.940
Finland 1.080 0.986 0.914
France 1.159 1.003 0.865
Germany 1.131 1.039 0.919
Ireland 1.170 1.066 0.912
Italy 1.138 1.003 0.881
Japan 1.144 0.985 0.861
Mexico 1.480 0.912 0.616
Netherlands 1.156 0.966 0.836
New Zealand 1.178 1.010 0.857
Norway 1.077 1.017 0.945
Poland 1.171 1.036 0.885
Portugal 1.265 1.099 0.869
Slovenia 1.077 1.063 0.986
South Korea 1.105 0.912 0.825
Spain 1.137 1.046 0.920
Sweden 1.078 1.023 0.949
Switzerland 1.149 0.951 0.828
Turkey 1.344 0.847 0.630
UK 1.210 1.141 0.944
US 1.192 1.043 0.875
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on cross-sectional data (1987-2009). Official
mean-to-median ratios are based on OECD Database, perceived mean-to-median ra-
tios are based on ISSP data. Years are only included, if they are available for both
measures.
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Figure 3.1: Generated perceived distributions based on cross-sectional data.
of weighted perceived inequality only takes values below 1. Its range from 0.986 to
0.594 evidences that inequality is underestimated to a quite considerable degree.
• The underestimation of inequality tends to be more pronounced in countries with
higher actual inequality: the coefficient of correlation between actual and perceived
mean-to-median ratios is −0.36.7
• In spite of this correlation, the country rankings with respect to actual and perceived
mean-to-median income ratios differ widely: the rank correlation coefficient is very
low at −0.06.
The low correlation can be explained by different patterns of bias between low and high
income groups. The relatively poor tend to overestimate their relative income while the
relatively rich underestimate their income rank as can be seen in Table 3.1. The net result -
whether the bias of the poor overrides the bias of the rich or vice versa - is not predictable
and differs between countries.
7A possible explanation for this observation might be a ‘just-world’ effect: people want to perceive the world
as fair, which necessitates that they hold larger biases the less fair the world actually is. See Trump (2014)
for a related observation in an experimental study.
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Table 3.2 is based on cross-sectional data. Table 3.A1 in the Appendix reports the weighted
perceived inequality measure per survey wave in the ISSP, corroborating the widespread
underestimation of inequality for every period.
3.3.2 Empirical results
Figure 3.2 provides first insights into the relationship between social spending and the in-
equality measures reported in Table 3.2. Social spending includes all public social expen-
ditures measured as percentag of GDP and is taken from the OECD Social Expenditure
Database (SOCX). Plotting social expenditure against actual and perceived inequality in dif-
ferent countries shows a negative correlation between social expenditures and actual inequal-
ity (left panel), while social expenditure and the perceived inequality (middle and right panel)
exhibit a positive association.
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Figure 3.2: Misjudgment and social expenditures.
Table 3.3 provides statistical support for these correlations. Summary statistics including all
inequality measures, control variables and the dependent variable are provided in Table 3.A2
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in the Appendix. Table 3.3 Panel A reports, in various specifications, the OLS regressions
of social expenditures (in percent of GDP) on actual income inequality, i.e., on the ratio of
mean to median income based on official OECD statistics. Specification (1) is the simple
regression between actual inequality and social spending, while regressions (2) to (5) add
further potential determinants of social spending: current GDP (to capture the positive in-
come elasticity of social spending), the average of total exports and imports as a percentage
of GDP (as a standard indicator for international trade openness), the dependency ratio (both
to capture the necessity for social spending), and average social expenditure in the 1980s (to
capture the path-dependence of social policy). Column (3) is the same as column (1) with
data from the 1980s omitted, which are then included in columns (4) and (5) as independent
variables.
In conflict with the predictions of the MR hypothesis – but quite in line with what previous
empirical studies have found –, the correlation between actual inequality and social spending
is always significantly negative, suggesting that lower inequality fosters redistribution.
Panel B of Table 3.3 reports the results from regressing, in the same sequence of specifica-
tions as before, social expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) on perceived income inequality,
as measured by the ratio of mean to median income in the distributions imputed from the an-
swers in the ISSP. The correlation between inequality and social expenditure now turns out to
be positive, in harmony with the MR hypothesis. With the exeption of columns (2) and (5),
the coefficient is statistically significant – and even the insignificant coefficients are more
in line with the theory than the corresponding negative one in Panel A. In essence, using
perceived rather than actual inequality leads to a better performance of the MR hypothesis.
Since there exists both a (negative) correlation between actual and perceived inequality (see
Section 3.3.1) and a (negative) correlation between actual inequality and social spending
(see Panel A of Table 3.3), we included actual inequality to avoid an omitted variable bias.
Panel C in Table 3.3 reports the regressions of social expenditure on the weighted perception
of inequality, as defined in Eq. (3.1). The coefficients of the measure of weighted perceptions
are highly statistically significant in all specifications and corroborate a positive relationship
between inequality and redistribution. We decide to present results from using the ratio of
perceived and factual inequality for a more intuitive interpretation. Of course, our results are
not driven by using this kind of meausure. Including both - perceived and factual inequality
- as separate control variables leads to similar results. The coefficient of perceived inequal-
ity remains positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient of factual inequality
remains negative.
Across the panels in Table 3.3, the coefficients of all control variables show the expected
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signs, when statistically significant. Only does specification (5) lead to an unexpected neg-
ative coefficient of per-capita GDP. Excluding lagged social expenditures eliminates this
unexpected sign, which might be due to the relatively high correlation between per-capita
GDP and lagged social spending. This correlation impedes an efficient estimation of the
correlation between both explanatory variables and the dependent variable.
In view of well-known endogeneity issues regressions of social spending on other variables
should be interpreted with caution. We cannot fully resolve these issues, but try to capture
them by including lagged social spending as an independent variable - as it is standard for
assessing the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis (see Tóth et al. (2011) for example). Including
lagged social expenditures decreases the absolute magnitude of the coefficients of all in-
equality measures (see columns (4) and (5) in Table 3.3). It does not affect, however, the
striking difference in signs across panels. Out of caution, we refrain from economically in-
terpreting the numerical magnitudes of coefficients. Still our results show that it is important
to differentiate between actual and perceived inequality.
3.3.3 Robustness checks
We subject our analysis to a variety of robustness checks, none of which qualitatively affects
our general conclusion. First, measuring the degree of redistribution by social expenditures
per capita (rather than by its percentage in GDP) again produces a positive link between
perceived inequality and redistribution (see Table 3.A3 in the Appendix).
We also include variables that previous studies found to be important drivers for (a pref-
erence for) more redistribution. These encompass religious attendance, trust, and political
ideology (left/right). We constructed quantitative measures for these variables, using data
from the World Values Surveys.8 The results reported in Panels A and B of Table 3.A4 in the
Appendix show that, while statistically insignificant jointly, a more leftist attitude, a lower
degree of trust and more frequent religious attendance ceteris paribus go along with more
redistribution (the latter only insignificantly). The associations between social spending and
the inequality measures remain unaffected, though.
Figure 3.2 might suggest that Mexico, Turkey, South Korea and Chile are outliers in our data
set. To rule out that they drive statistical significance, we run regressions that exclude them.
This does not affect our main results (Panel A and Panel C) qualitatively.9
8Data can also be obtained from the ISSP. We use the World Values Surveys to keep our sample constant (the
ISSP lacks data for Belgium, Mexico, South Korea, Finland, and Turkey).
9Results are available on request. Essentially, regressions only using the simple perceived inequality measure
(Panel B) lose statistical significance, while maintaining their signs.
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Given the limited size of our sample, we also estimate jackknife standard errors to check the
robustness of our results. As can be seen in Table 3.A5, the loss of statistical significance is
negligible.
To increase the number of observations we run pooled OLS regressions10, too. Results are
shown in Table 3.A6. The first three columns replicate regressions of our main specification
in Table 3.3 and in the last two columns wave dummies11 are included. Results do not change
qualitatively.
3.4 The POUM hypothesis and perceived social
mobility
3.4.1 Perceived vs. experienced social mobility
The POUM hypothesis posits that redistribution by the government is lower in democracies
the higher is the degree of upward mobility. As with the MR model in the previous sec-
tion, we again argue that distinguishing between perceived and actual mobility is of crucial
importance when empirically testing this hypothesis.
The ISSP provides data that can be used to measure experienced (= actual) as well as per-
ceived social upward mobility. Experienced mobility is addressed in this survey question:
‘Please think about your present job (or your last one if you don’t have one now).
If you compare this job to the job your father had when you were 14,15,16,
would you say that the level of status of your job is (or was) . . . 1. Much lower
than your father’s, 2. Lower, 3. About equal, 4. Higher or 5. Much higher than
your father’s?’
The share of respondents who choose answers 4 or 5 (i.e., the fraction of people who think
they moved ahead of their fathers in their occupations) serves as our measure of experienced
mobility in a society (also see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Corneo and Grüner, 2002;
Schokkaert and Truyts, 2014).12
10We estimate White-Huber standard errors to control for heteroscedastic error terms
11In some cases data on social expenditures and inequality measures are not at hand for the same year. Since we
posit that inequality impacts on social expenditures, regressions were defined in such a way that inequality
measures were merged with social expenditures at least one year later.
12When calculating the measure, we exclude all people who have never had a job or who do not know what
their father did, never knew their father or whose father never had a job.
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Our measure of expected or perceived upward mobility is based on the hard-work question
(also see Alesina et al., 2004; Bjoernskov et al., 2013; Corneo and Grüner, 2002):
‘Please tick one box to show how important you think hard work is for getting
ahead in life (1 – not important at all; 5 – essential).’
Higher numbers indicate a stronger perception that social structures are permeable, allowing
for upward mobility. For comparability, we normalize this measure to the unit interval and
then compute, for each country, the average importance of hard work for getting ahead.
Table 3.4: Upward mobility
(1) (2)
experienced perceived
Austria 0.436 0.721
Canada 0.501 0.740
Chile 0.358 0.669
Czech Republic 0.362 0.638
Denmark 0.468 0.681
Finland 0.482 0.744
France 0.552 0.629
Germany 0.420 0.696
Hungary 0.411 0.646
Italy 0.524 0.730
Israel 0.482 0.677
Japan 0.212 0.703
New Zealand 0.438 0.784
Norway 0.420 0.726
Poland 0.504 0.724
Portugal 0.600 0.703
Slovenia 0.389 0.649
South Korea 0.377 0.858
Spain 0.523 0.675
Sweden 0.391 0.718
Switzerland 0.466 0.761
Turkey 0.353 0.798
UK 0.496 0.727
US 0.500 0.816
Source: authors’ calculations.
Table 3.4 reports the average values of experienced and expected mobility in our sample.
The sample covers the years in 1992, 1999 and 2009 for 24 OECD countries in the ISSP.13
Yearly figures are collected in Table 3.A7 in the Appendix. In 2009, from column (1), the
likelihood of being in a higher occupation than one’s father ranges from 0.222 in Japan to
0.531 in France. Column (2), where values of perceived mobility range between 0.681 and
13These are: Austria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland,
Turkey, UK, and the US.
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0.878, evidences that people in all sampled countries tend to believe in the importance of
hard work for getting ahead and, thus, view their society as allowing for social mobility
(albeit to different degrees).
3.4.2 Empirical results
Figure 3.3 visualizes a (positive) association between social expenditures (in percent of GDP)
and experienced upward mobility as well as a (negative) correlation between social spending
and perceived upward mobility. The contrast in directions is similar to what we encountered
for the MR hypothesis.14
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Figure 3.3: Redistribution and upward mobility.
The regressions reported in Table 3.5 confirm the prima facie evidence of Figure 3.3 econo-
metrically. The regressions of redistribution on experienced mobility in Panel A indicate –
if anything – a weakly positive correlation, contradicting the POUM hypothesis. Once, we
control for path dependence of social spending, the results are statistically insignificant. By
contrast, using perceptions as an explanatory variable vindicates the POUM hypothesis (see
14While cross-sectional data are used in Figure 3.3, we again checked that these correlations also hold for
every single time period.
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Panel B): the greater is perceived social mobility, the smaller is the extent of redistribution.
All coefficients are statistically significant, at least at the 5%-level. Moreover, these obser-
vations are invariant across different specifications, which follow the same pattern as in the
previous section (see columns (2) to (4)).
3.4.3 Robustness checks
Again, we subjected our analysis to various robustness checks. First, we re-defined the
measure of actual (= experienced) mobility by calculating the probability of being in a much
better occupation than one’s father. This more restrictive definition renders all results based
on experienced mobility statistically significant (but with coefficients still positive) and, thus,
does not alter our general conclusion (results are available on request).
The ‘hard-work question’, though widely used in the literature, need not perfectly reflect
expected upward mobility: even if (one believes that) social mobility is low one could be
convinced of the importance of hard work for getting ahead. Therefore, we experimented
with a measure of perceived immobility: it takes a value of one for a respondent who states
that hard work is not important at all to get ahead (and value zero otherwise). For such a
respondent we can assume that he does not believe in upward mobility. In line with the
POUM hypothesis we would expect that social spending increases with higher perceived
social immobility, measured by the population average of the immobility values. As can be
seen in Table 3.A8 in the Appendix, this in fact holds empirically.
Table 3.A9 in the Appendix demonstrates that controlling for political and religious atti-
tudes corroborates our findings: Panel A suggests that redistribution is lower the higher is
actual social mobility (thus, questioning the factual version of the POUM hypothesis), while
Panel B evidences a negative correlation between perceived mobility and social spending.
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3.5 Conclusions
In democratic political systems the perceptions of the electorate on policy issues matter, po-
tentially even more than objective data. If citizen-voters see an issue, politics has to respond
– even if there is no issue; conversely, if a (real) problem is not salient with voters, it is not
likely to be addressed forcefully by politicians.
This idea can be applied to ‘populist’ politics of progressive, redistributive tax-transfer pro-
grams. Our study suggests that perceived inequality and expected upwards mobility are rea-
sonably good predictors of social policy, and at least better than measures based on objective,
offical or actual data.
Our attempt to trace social expenditures back to perceptions of inequality opens directions
for future research. First, to check the stability of our observations it will be interesting
to re-run, with measures of perceived inequality or social mobility, some of the elaborate
empirical studies in the literature that have tested the MR or the POUM hypothesis with
objective measures. Second, changing the dependent variable from actual social spending to
preferences for redistribution will show whether perceptions also matter for voters’ political
demands and wishes, as indicated in Gimpelson and Treisman (2015). Finally, while we
took perceptions as exogenous, one could study how these perceptions are shaped. This
could then give rise to a more complete understanding of political choices in democracies.
35
3 Biased perceptions of income inequality and redistribution
3.6 Appendix
Table 3.A1: Weighted perceived inequality by year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1987 1992 1999 2006/07 2008/09
Austria 0.954 0.950 0.921
Belgium 0.912
Canada 0.919 0.900 0.854
Chile 0.537 0.633
Czech Republic 0.924 0.795 0.834
Denmark 0.940
Finland 0.887 0.920
France 0.965 0.819 0.797
Germany 0.969 0.991 1.000 0.803 0.835
Ireland 0.899 0.902
Italy 0.912 0.835
Japan 0.932 0.828 0.816
Mexico 0.616
Netherlands 0.831 0.838
New Zealand 0.837 0.889 0.820 0.837
Norway 0.966 0.894 0.987 0.918
Poland 0.909 0.864 0.923
Portugal 0.843 0.898
Slovenia 1.094 0.972 0.916
South Korea 0.833 0.817
Spain 1.013 0.872 0.873
Sweden 0.996 0.964 0.938 0.927
Switzerland 0.828
Turkey 0.630
UK 0.967 0.934 0.944
US 0.905 0.919 0.877 0.888 0.788
Notes: Weighted perceived inequality is the ratio of perceived mean-to-median
ratio (ISSP) and official mean-to-median ratio (OECD).
This Table shows the available data for our sample. As can be seen, there is only
one observation for Belgium, Denmark, Mexico, Switzerland, and Turkey.
Data limitations result from missing ISSP data in the remaining years. These
countries get lost in the pooled OLS specification (Table 3.A6).
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Table 3.A2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
inequality (OECD) 1.185 0.14 1.059 1.656
perceived inequality 1.021 0.068 0.917 1.146
weighted perception 0.869 0.076 0.656 0.995
socx 19.992 6.586 5.936 29.513
socx80s 16.143 7.703 0 28.933
gdp (per capita) 24195 7223 9789 37290
trade openness 75.23 33.245 24.042 148.304
dependency ratio 33.230 1.921 29.194 38.778
ideology 5.422 0.345 4.727 6.063
attendance 3.956 1.062 2.387 6.068
trust 0.359 0.166 0.115 0.695
Notes: Summary statistics are based on cross-sectional data from 1987 to 2009.
Perceived inequality is based on ISSP data, ideology, attendance, and trust are
based on the World Values Survey (WVS), the remaining variables are based on the OECD
iLibrary.
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Table 3.A7: Measures for upward mobility by year
1992 1999 2009
experienced perceived experienced perceived experienced perceived
Austria 0.434 0.773 0.4293 0.631 0.444 0.759
Canada 0.537 0.823 0.466 0.658
Chile 0.344 0.575 0.372 0.764
Czech Republic 0.382 0.460 0.343 0.816
Denmark 0.468 0.681
Finland 0.482 0.744
France 0.574 0.533 0.531 0.725
Germany 0.457 0.725 0.383 0.666
Hungary 0.448 0.719 0.445 0.422 0.341 0.798
Italy 0.578 0.706 0.471 0.755
Israel 0.532 0.578 0.432 0.776
Japan 0.202 0.638 0.222 0.768
New Zealand 0.442 0.848 0.440 0.624 0.432 0.878
Norway 0.384 0.779 0.427 0.581 0.448 0.819
Poland 0.516 0.805 0.494 0.553 0.500 0.816
Portugal 0.630 0.529 0.569 0.878
Slovenia 0.392 0.689 0.3819 0.472 0.392 0.784
South Korea 0.377 0.858
Spain 0.574 0.579 0.472 0.772
Sweden 0.354 0.755 0.374 0.615 0.443 0.784
Switzerland 0.466 0.761
Turkey 0.353 0.798
UK 0.517 0.831 0.474 0.623
US 0.565 0.849 0.478 0.724 0.458 0.876
Table 3.A8: Social expenditures (in % of GDP) and perceived immobility
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
perceived immobility 34.61 (21.27) 34.23* (19.27) 34.84** (13.67)
socex80s 0.795*** (0.118) 0.681*** (0.170) 0.665*** (0.152)
logGDP 2.316 (2.529) 3.074 (3.585)
openness 0.0302 (0.0363) 0.852* (0.424)
dependency ratio 0.418 (0.475) 0.0575 (0.0341)
ideology -2.921 (2.151)
rel. attendance 1.222* (0.675)
trust -0.750 (6.666)
constant 54.63*** (15.97) -31.34 (34.95) -43.70 (39.30)
R2 0.825 0.847 0.888
N 22 22 22
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗∗∗p<0.01,∗∗ p<0.05,∗p<0.1
Dependent variable: Social expenditures in percent of GDP
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4 What do Germans think and
know about income inequality?
A survey experiment1
4.1 Introduction
What do Germans know and think about income inequality in their country? In a nutshell:
they do not know much. In particular, they do not know their own position in the income
distribution. They know that they do not know much – but across all income groups they
think that inequality should be reduced. They do not change their minds when they learn
more about inequality – only those who learn that they are net contributors to the tax transfer
system become less supportive of more redistribution.
These are the main observations from a survey experiment on the perceptions and prefer-
ences of Germans with respect to income inequality and redistribution that we conducted in
early 2015 and that we report in this paper. While there is some international evidence (sur-
veyed in Section 4.2) that perceived inequality does not coincide with measured, ‘objective’
inequality, a detailed analysis for Germany has, to our knowledge, not been available so far.
We conducted a survey in a representative sample of 1,100 German households that included
two randomized information treatments (see Section 4.3). Participants were asked for the in-
come of their household, for their perceived own rank in the German income distribution, for
their opinions on the current level of inequality and about their perceptions and preferences
of social stratification.
Our first observation is that survey respondents systematically fail to locate their own posi-
tion in the income scale even roughly. Relatively poor respondents tend to overestimate their
1This chapter is co-authored with Andreas Wagener, Institute of Economic Policy, University of Hannover.
It is forthcoming in the Socio-Economic Review and is available via https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwx036.
Publication within this thesis with kind permission of Oxford University Press. An earlier version of this
chapter is available as ECINEQ Working Paper 2016 - 389.
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own rank while relatively rich respondents tend to underestimate their relative income. Cum
grano salis, this suggests that the income distribution is perceived to be more equalized than
it actually is. When respondents were asked which of several stylized shapes best describes
the German society today, they were right only slightly more often than by chance.
An unexpected second observation is that respondents across all income groups asked for
more redistribution. Not only was this preference omnipresent – its strength is fairly constant
across income deciles. Moreover, asked for their most-preferred pattern of stratification,
respondents selected the most egalitarian ones out of the choices we gave them.
In two information treatments we checked how far redistributive preference is driven by bi-
ased perceptions. The treatment group was informed about their true position in the income
distribution. This information did not alter preferences for redistribution, though. One po-
tential interpretation is that, given that already the pretreatment preferences for more redistri-
bution were strong, a treatment that, if anything, taught respondents that income inequality
was higher than they had previously thought, cannot have much effect. In a second step,
members of the (first) treatment group were informed whether they were net contributors to,
or net beneficiaries from, the tax-transfer system in Germany. Respondents who learned that
they were losing from redistribution asked for less redistribution afterwards.
We would like to emphasize the agnostic nature of our survey. In particular, we did not
conduct it with a view that respondents hold – or should hold – a stable, consistent or well-
argued view on redistribution. We just wanted to find out what respondents really know and
think. Still, it is tempting to distill some coherence out of the responses we obtained. As far
as possible, we tried; more far-reaching interpretations would be speculative and not backed
by the survey data themselves.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 embeds our survey experiment and
its findings into the extant literature. Section 4.3 describes the survey and our sample. Sec-
tion 4.4 documents the biases in the self-assessment of income positions. Section 4.5 turns
to the strong preferences for redistribution, both before and after informational treatment.
Perceptions of and preferences for social stratification are discussed in Section 4.6. Sec-
tion 4.7 shows that pocketbook attenuate preferences for redistribution. Some conclusions
are offered in Section 4.8. Additional material is collected in an Appendix.
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4.2 Related literature
Our survey experiment on the correlations between (mis-)perceptions of inequality and views
on redistribution is related to a number of contributions in the literature.
Similar surveys: To the best of our knowledge, studies of similar type so far only exist for
Argentina, Sweden and Norway. Cruces et al. (2013) collected data on household incomes
and on the self-assessments of income ranks in the Argentine income distribution. Their
study finds that the relatively poor tend to overestimate their relative positions while the
relatively rich tend to underestimate theirs. When biased subjects were confronted with
accurate information, (only) the preferences of the relatively poor changed in the direction
of calling for more redistribution. Karadja et al. (2017) ran a similar survey experiment
for Sweden. Roughly three-quarters of their respondents missed their relative position by
more than 10 percentage points, and 92 % of this group underestimated their position. An
information treatment was largely ineffective; only conservative respondents who learned
that they were richer than they thought demanded less redistribution. In a study on the
effects of income transparency on well-being in Norway, Perez-Truglia (2016) finds biases
in respondents’ perceptions of their own relative income ranks. An information treatment
moderated these biases and made respondents change their preferences for redistribution
(the gradient between redistribution preferences and actual income rank should increased).
We transfer the setting of Cruces et al. (2013) and Karadja et al. (2017) to the German case.
Our study differs, however, by including assessments of social stratification (for a motivation,
see below) and pocketbook concerns. Our first finding – that the poor think they are richer
and vice versa – is in line with previous observations. Our second observation – that better
knowledge does not change minds – adds a piece of negative evidence to the mixed collection
of results on information treatments.
Misperceptions of inequality: Our survey respondents substantially misperceive the in-
come distribution in Germany: they systematically fail to locate their own position on the in-
come scale and they get the assessment of the (stylized) social stratification in Germany right
only slightly more often than by mere chance. Such misperceptions on income inequality are
not uncommon, irrespective of how (perceived) inequality is measured.2 Using perceived
2Popular misperceptions also prevail with other issues (inflation, corruption, risks etc.). See Stevenson and
Duch (2013) for a discussion. A potential common root is that individuals make inferences about objective
reality from the limited sample of their own experiences and observations. For example, their reference
group – relatives, friends, neighbors and colleagues – is typically not a cross-section of society but less
heterogeneous. This biased and limited availability of social comparison leads to biased inferences (e.g.
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wage differences between various occupations, Osberg and Smeeding (2006) find a massive
underestimation of wage inequality in the US. Kenworthy and McCall (2008) calculate per-
ceived relative wage levels for different countries and show that perceived and actual time
trends of inequality are inconsistent. Norton and Ariely (2011) exhibit a dramatic underesti-
mation of wealth inequality in the US population. Engelhardt and Wagener (2014) construct
hypothetical perceived income distributions for 26 OECD countries by aggregating the self-
positioning among International Social Survey Program (ISSP) respondents; they find that
the inequality in these perceived distributions is considerably below actual inequality.
Not all studies find that populations underestimate inequality in their societies. Using the
ISSP question which type of society, visualized by rhomb- or pyramid-shaped graphs, best
describes the society respondents were living in, Niehues (2014) and Gimpelson and Treis-
man (2015) show that knowledge of social stratification is low, but involves an overestimation
of inequality. This suggests that studies based on individual incomes, wages or wealth and
the attending self-positioning biases observe an underestimation of inequality while studies
using perceived social stratification detect an overestimation of inequality. Both approaches,
called the ‘comparative’ and the ‘normative’ view in D’Ambrosio and Clark (2015), differ
conceptually: the first presupposes that the perceived structure of the society (or at least of
its income distribution) is derived from one’s own position, relative to some reference group.
By contrast, the second approach operates with the structure of society as a whole and does
not require that individuals position themselves in the perceived or desired society. We com-
bine both approaches in our survey – and indeed confirm for Germany that biases go into
different directions.
Information treatments: Methodologically, our survey design follows a strand of liter-
ature that uses information as an experimental treatment in a field setting. Some studies sup-
port the knowledge gap theory proposed by Tichenor et al. (1970), arguing that differences
in decision quality are, to some degree, based on different levels of knowledge. In a rational
choice approach this would imply that, when new information arrives, people update their
beliefs (e.g. in a Bayesian fashion), which might affect their revealed preferences. For exam-
ple, Duflo and Saez (2003) show this with regard to retirement plans and Jensen (2010) with
regard to educational decisions. Other studies provide evidence for the knowledge-behavior
gap theory, due to Hornik (1989), positing that additional information will only affect deci-
sions and actions if it successfully changes the underlying beliefs, habits, emotions etc. on
which decisions are based.
The results of our rather ineffective first information treatment indicate – in line with
Evans and Kelley, 2004; Runciman, 1966).
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knowledge-behavior gap theory – that information does not suffice to change minds; what
matters is whether beliefs or constraints are addressed by the information treatment. Inter-
estingly, however, the more effective second information treatment with its direct appeal to
individual monetary (dis-)advantages shows a potentially promising way to make knowledge
updates change behavior.
4.3 Survey and sample
4.3.1 The survey
The online survey was conducted in February 2015 and interviewed a random sample of
1,100 households in Germany. Data collection was performed by Norstat company.3 All
participants were asked for their incomes, for a set of individual and household character-
istics and general political attitudes as well as for their views and knowledge on income
inequality in Germany. Two informational treatments (detailed below) followed.
In terms of income, we asked respondents for the average monthly income of their house-
hold in 2014.4 To enable respondents to make meaningful comparisons of households of
different size, we broadly explained to them the concept of equivalent incomes, and then
informed them about their monthly net household income corrected by the modified OECD
equivalence weight. We then asked them:
‘What do you think, how many households in Germany have an equal or lower
standard of living than yours?’
Response categories were given in deciles. We then compared respondents’ perceived decile
to their actual income decile. These objective deciles were calculated from the boundaries of
deciles of the German monthly net household income distribution, corrected by the modified
OECD equivalence weights, based on the then most recent German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP 2012, v29).
Social stratification was expressed by five different stylized types of society (for details see
Section 4.6). We introduced them to our respondents and asked them to state which type best
describes German society today and of which type Germany ought to be.
3Norstat is a market research company (http://opinion-people.com/de). Participants in Norstat panels can
collect points that can be exchanged for money.
4In 2015 – the survey year – a minimum wage was implemented in Germany. Therefore, we restrict our
analysis to the previous period to avoid (unknown) biases resulting from this reform.
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The experiment proceeded as follows: after a first set of questions on attitudes toward in-
come inequality and social stratification, income, and self-assessment in the income distri-
bution for everybody, we randomly split the group of participants into two halves who would
continue with different questionnaires. Each questionnaire again posed questions on respon-
dents’ preferences for redistribution and social stratification, but they differed in the amount
of information we provided to participants: before we asked them to (re-)state their prefer-
ences, individuals in the treatment group were informed about the income distribution, their
actual relative position and their self-positioning bias; the control group did not get any such
information.
Our design is inspired by the information treatment in Cruces et al. (2013), but we provided
the treatment group with detailed information about the actual income distribution, their
relative position in it and which income belongs to the relative position they estimated to be
associated with. All information was given graphically and in written.
To test the role of self-interest and pocketbook concerns we implemented, within the first
treatment group, a second information treatment.5 Here, we informed respondents whether
they are (likely to be) a net payer or net beneficiary from the German tax-transfer system.
This information does not target at respondents’ beliefs but at their budget constraints.
Our design allows us to use difference-in-differences approaches when assessing outcomes.
We included two information treatments to check the robustness of the stated preferences
for (more) redistribution. In Sections 4.5 and 4.6 we will report on the first information
treatment. The second treatment will be dealt with in Section 4.7. The (English translation
of the) full questionnaire of the survey experiment is provided in the Appendix.
4.3.2 The sample
Our survey was quoted according to age and gender, which consequently lead to a represen-
tative age structure in the sample.6 Treatment and control groups are also balanced along key
variables like education, income, political ideology and so on. Around 92 % of the respon-
dents were born in Germany. Our sample is slightly more educated and their mean income
is lower than in the general population (probably because the sample did not include earners
5The first and the second treatment are separate events, and (potential) changes in preferences were separately
surveyed.
6Potential respondents did not know that they were going to be asked for their views on inequality or re-
distribution. Selection into the survey, thus, did not a priori favor people with strong views or interest in
these issues. Respondents spent on average five minutes on the survey, with a median time of 4′30′. Given
the moderate length of the survey, these answering times appear appropriate. Unfortunately, we have no
information about attrition rates. For people who aborted the survey, no data were saved.
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of very high incomes).7 A comparison of selective main characteristics between the general
German population and our survey sample can be seen in Table 4.A1 in the Appendix.
We dropped the first (net income below 400e) and the hundredth percentile (net income
above 5000e) from our sample for data cleaning reasons. The remaining sample consists
of 859 observations. The left-hand panel of Figure 4.1 shows the income distribution of our
sample by income deciles, taken from the GSOEP, v29. A fully representative sample should
exhibit a 10 % density in every decile. In our sample, low income deciles are somewhat over-
represented, while high income deciles are underrepresented. Otherwise, the inaccuracies in
the distribution of incomes are negligible.
To capture potential correlates of attitudes towards redistribution, we constructed a number of
variables for our sample (see Table 4.A2 in the Appendix for a list). To measure whether the
availability of social comparisons shapes perceptions and positions on income inequality, we
defined dummy variable (reference group) with value of one when a respondent stated that
his/her reference group encompasses all social classes.8 This holds for 13 % of respondents;
26 % state to be mainly in contact with the lower class, 62 % with the middle class and 3 %
with the upper class.
Bartels (2005, 2008) argues that perceptions of inequality are systematically shaped by po-
litical ideology, with conservatives being less aware of (changes in) inequality, even when
controlling for their general political knowledge. We let respondents self-locate their ideo-
logical position on a scale from 1 (‘left’) to 10 (‘right’), from which we constructed variable
ideology.
The demand for redistribution can also be associated to individuals’ views on the fairness of
the income distribution. Following Corneo and Grüner (2002), we asked respondents (as in
the ISSP) ‘How important is hard work for getting ahead in life?’, with five categories from
‘essential’ to ‘not important at all’. We include this as a regressor (hard work), too.
Media consumption may be relevant, too. We asked respondents how often (daily, weekly,
monthly, rarely or never) they used different media (newspaper, TV, Internet). In all, 75%
of respondents watch news in TV or read news in the internet daily, and 37% read a daily
newspaper. We constructed a variable informed to summarize all media usage, with greater
numbers indicating higher levels of usage.
7We also checked whether or not results are robust against re-weighting our observations according to income
deciles by six different age groups. Mean and median income increase noticeably, nevertheless, our results
are robust against using sample weights. Main results of regressions using sample weights can be seen in
Table 4.A8 in the Appendix.
8We asked this question at the end of the survey, after having uncovered the actual type of society.
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4.4 Biases in self-assessments
4.4.1 Measurement and descriptives
The right-hand part of Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of our respondents across (actual)
income deciles, based on their self-assessments. This distribution is considerably less dis-
persed than the objective one. Moreover, lower income groups tend to overestimate their rel-
ative income position while higher income groups tend to underestimate the relative income.
If, as in Cruces et al. (2013), these biases are the result of respondents’ flawed inferences
from own social experiences with differences in incomes to the entire income distribution,
our observations indicate a widespread underestimation.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of objective and perceived income decile.
We defined as variable bias the difference between perceived and actual decile. A negative
[positive] bias indicates an underestimation [overestimation] of one’s income decile. Ta-
ble 4.1 provides a detailed picture of respondents’ self-positioning biases, sorted by actual
income deciles. Column (1) shows that the average perceived own decile ranges from 3.106
(in the first decile) to 6.240 (in the 10th decile). In the middle of the income distribution
the mean bias [column (2)] is relatively small, but it increases towards both ends. Percep-
tions of relatively poor respondents are positively based [columns (3) and (4)], while the
relatively rich tend to underestimate their relative income position which leads to negative
biases [columns (5) and (6)]. The distribution of biases is also shown in Figure 4.A1 in the
Appendix.
In Table 4.2, we report correlates of perceived deciles other than objective relative income.
As can be seen in column (1), the objective income rank is a statistically highly significant
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Table 4.1: Self-positioning bias by income decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
objective average perceived mean proportion with average proportion with average
decile own decile bias positive bias positive bias negative bias negative bias
1 3.106 2.106 0.695 3.031 0.000 0.000
2 3.330 1.330 0.582 2.547 0.154 -1.000
3 3.725 0.725 0.418 2.684 0.319 -1.241
4 4.055 0.055 0.397 1.828 0.438 -1.531
5 4.174 -0.826 0.174 1.600 0.640 -1.727
6 4.369 -1.631 0.131 1.455 0.810 -2.250
7 4.695 -2.305 0.061 1.200 0.805 -2.955
8 4.930 -3.070 0.012 1.000 0.965 -3.193
9 4.947 -4.053 0.000 0.000 1.000 -4.053
10 6.240 -3.760 0.000 0.000 1.000 -3.760
Notes: Bias is defined as perceived income decile minus objective income decile. See Table A.1 for detailed
definitions.
correlate. Due to the systematic bias, the regression coefficient is lower than one. This
observation remains stable after including individual characteristics as age, gender, education
level, and political ideology.
Perceived income positions are not correlated with age or gender. Regression coefficients
are fairly small and not statistically significant. A higher education level – measured in
highest degree – decreases the perceived relative income rank: a higher level of education
level is positively correlated with a negative bias (underestimation of one’s own income
rank) and negatively correlated with a positive bias (overestimation of relative income).9
The coefficient of political ideology is positive but close to zero, indicating that a more
conservative ideology goes along with a slightly higher perception of one’s relative income.
Table 4.2: Determinants of perceived own income decile
(1) (2)
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
objective decile 0.275*** (0.022) 0.275*** (0.023)
age 0.0042 (0.005)
women -0.0238 (0.125)
education -0.107* (0.062)
ideology 0.0694** (0.034)
constant 2.818*** (0.124) 2.702*** (0.411)
R2 0.158 0.168
N 859 859
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p<0.01,∗ ∗
p<0.05,∗p<0.1. Dependent variable: perceived own income decile.
See Table A.1 for detailed definitions.
9Precise correlations between controls and bias groups are available on request.
52
4 What do Germans think and know about income inequality?
There is no significant correlation between the self-positioning bias and the self-assessment
of respondents’ reference group, measured by variable reference group. Regressing in-
formedness (i.e. variable informed) on bias groups, we observe, however, a significant neg-
ative correlation with positive bias and a significant positive correlation with negative bias.
However, there is also a high correlation between informed and income; if we control for
income, the significance of the correlations vanishes. We do not have evidence, thus, that
respondents who are well informed about current affairs have a more precise picture of their
income rank.
As respondents systematically fail to locate themselves in the income distribution, we want
to know how sure they were in their answers. A mere 14% of respondents reported that they
were sure or very sure about their self-positioning, 48% were somewhat sure and 38% not
sure at all. Overall, people seem to know that they do not know very much. Interestingly,
the reported levels of confidence do not vary across perceived income deciles. Therefore, we
can refute the objection that respondents choose middle categories for their self-positioning
if they have no clue.
To sum up: respondents know little about their relative income and they are aware of this
fact.
4.5 Preferences for redistribution
4.5.1 Initial preferences
Even before the self-assessments we had asked respondents about their general opinion on
redistribution in Germany. Answers were coded in seven categories, ranging from 1 (‘There
is too much effort to equalize incomes.’) over 4 (‘It is fine as it is.’) to 7 (‘Income inequality
is far too high and should be reduced.’). We take respondents’ answers as their revealed pref-
erence for more/less redistribution. An overwhelming majority of 83 % of the respondents
asks for more redistribution (categories 5-7), 11 % are satisfied with the status quo (category
4) and merely 6 % think there is too much income equalization in Germany (categories 1-3).
This is a strong and surprising observation, and we had a more detailed look at respondents’
preferences for redistribution. We first study the mean preferences for redistribution by in-
come deciles. 10 As can be seen in column (1) of Table 4.3, mean preferences for redistribu-
10We report results for perceived income decile because perceptions might matter more for political pref-
erences than the (unknown) actual position. Results for mean preferences in actual income deciles are
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tion range from 4.125 in the top perceived decile to 6.100 in the lowest perceived decile. This
indicates that there is a quite uniform (average) preference for more redistribution and greater
income equality across all deciles of perceived income (recall that 4 signifies a preference
for the status quo). Moreover, between the second and ninth decile, the average preferences
for redistribution do not show much variation. Preferences are, thus, remarkably homoge-
neous across income groups. Moreover, we do not observe any differences in preferences for
redistribution within and across the political spectrum. Especially, the correlation between
preferences for redistribution and stated political ideology is very low (rho = −0.16). The
generally very high popularity of more redistribution from left to right is also reflected in the
programs of all major German parties (excluding, possibly, the small liberal party) that all
advocate ‘more’ social justice.
These observations are in harmony with the pattern one gets from the ISSP. Summary statis-
tics for answers from Germany can be seen in Table 4.A4, column (1) and Figure 4.A2.
Again, mean preferences are quite similar across perceived income deciles: virtually every-
body asks for more redistribution.11
4.5.2 Informed preferences
Preferences generally depend on the perceived relative position. If an information treatment
just confirms individual perceptions, nothing should happen. But if the perception is initially
wrong and then corrected by an information treatment, preferences might be updated.
First insights emerge from columns (2) and (3) in Table 4.3.12 The columns report mean
preferences for redistribution in the perceived income deciles for, respectively, treatment and
control group. Differences are small, and the values do not visibly differ from the replies
to the initial question, reported in column (1). Changes in preferences for redistribution by
initial self-positioning bias can be seen in Figure 4.A4. Changes are shown for treatment and
control group, separately. The graphs show that the magnitudes in changes are small across
all degrees of misperceptions (the large values at the extreme ends are not very informative
as only very few respondents erred that dramatically in their initial assessments).
To identify whether or not there is a treatment effect, we used both the simple first-difference
reported in Table 4.A3. They are qualitatively the same as for perceived deciles.
11Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4.A4 and Figure 4.A3 show that this phenomenon is not confined to Germany:
the mean preferences for redistribution by perceived income decile for Sweden and Argentina – the two
countries for which comparable studies exist (Cruces et al., 2013; Karadja et al., 2017) – also lie in a
relatively small range.
12See columns (2) and (3) in Table 4.A3 for mean preferences by income decile.
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Table 4.3: (Mean) Preferences for redistribution by perceived income decile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
initial 1st treatment 1st treatment 2nd treatment
preferences (treated) (control) (of the treated)
perc. decile Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
1 6.100 (1.241) 6.243 (0.955) 5.906 (1.304) 6.162 (0.958)
2 5.763 (1.319) 5.933 (1.087) 5.731 (1.430) 5.683 (1.308)
3 5.730 (1.186) 5.702 (1.144) 6.048 (0.877) 5.606 (1.280)
4 5.679 (1.212) 5.707 (1.250) 5.839 (1.059) 5.480 (1.379)
5 5.430 (1.426) 5.347 (1.465) 5.500 (1.422) 5.236 (1.477)
6 5.543 (1.456) 5.452 (1.418) 5.653 (1.451) 5.310 (1.490)
7 5.592 (1.308) 5.714 (1.132) 5.765 (1.208) 5.476 (1.194)
8 5.500 (1.767) 5.700 (1.342) 6.118 (1.054) 5.600 (1.603)
9 6.000 (1.155) 6.500 (0.707) 7.000 (0.000) 6.000 (1.414)
10 4.125 (1.642) 4.250 (0.957) 4.250 (1.258) 3.750 (2.217)
Notes: Preferences for redistribution are coded from 1 to 7. For more details see Table A.1.
estimator as well as a difference in differences estimator. As our sample size is too small,
we cannot meaningfully estimate potential treatment effects for each pair of perceived and
factual income decile. We, therefore, choose plausible larger subgroups and partitioned re-
spondents into those who held no bias, a positive bias or a negative bias in their income as-
sessment. For the ‘no-bias-respondents’ the information treatment just confirms their beliefs
and we, thus, do not expect any treatment effect. But the information treatment (truthfully)
may change the beliefs of respondents with a bias.
Results are reported in Table 4.4. Columns (1) to (3) show the average preferences for redis-
tribution of those who, respectively, underestimated, correctly assessed, and overestimated
their relative income positions. Panel A uses the full sample – and shows that the treatment
did not generate any statistically significant effects, neither for simple differences nor for
differences in differences. Furthermore, differences in differences coefficients are not only
statistically insignificant, but also close to zero.
A plausible explanation for the lack of effect is, of course, that our information treatment
– which should make most respondents conclude that inequality is more pronounced than
they initially thought – further cemented their strong preference for redistribution (recall that
more than 83% of the respondents stated a preference for more redistribution already at the
outset).
To check whether the information treatment at least impacted on those who had initially
not been for more redistribution, we restrict our sample to these respondents. This shrinks
the number of observations dramatically. However, as reported in Panel B of Table 4.4, we
do not observe any statistically significant difference between control and treatment group.
Nevertheless, we cannot completely reject moderate differences with the statistical power
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Table 4.4: (Perceived) distribution and preferences for redistribution: exper-
imental results
(1) (2) (3)
Negative Bias No Bias Positive Bias
Panel A: Full Sample
Treatment group [obs.] 5.694 [248] 5.696 [69] 5.679 [131]
Control group [obs.] 5.681 [220] 5.897 [68] 5.923 [118]
Difference [s.e.] 0.012 [0.110] -0.201 [0.222] -0.244 [0.169]
Diff-in-Diff [s.e.] 0.079 [0.162] -0.060 [0.332] 0.005 [0.242]
Panel B: Initial preference for less redistribution
Treatment group [obs.] 4.098 [41] 3.875 [16] 4.000 [24]
Control group [obs.] 3.897 [39] 4.000 [8] 3.950 [20]
Difference [s.e.] 0.200 [0.257] -0.125 [0.552] 0.050 [0.479]
Diff-in-Diff [s.e.] 0.249 [0.329] -0.750 [0.697] -0.108 [0.570]
Panel C: Above average bias
Treatment group [obs.] 5.631 [122] 5.696 [69] 5.435 [46]
Control group [obs.] 5.570 [114] 5.897 [68] 5.978 [45]
Difference [s.e.] 0.061 [0.159] -0.201 [0.222] -0.543* [0.292]
Diff-in-Diff [s.e.] 0.032 [0.235] -0.060 [0.332] -0.173 [0.427]
Panel D: Leftist attitude
Treatment group [obs.] 6.000 [78] 6.259 [27] 5.700 [40]
Control group [obs.] 5.989 [90] 5.885 [26] 6.119 [42]
Difference [s.e.] 0.011 [0.157] 0.375 [0.282] -0.419* [0.280]
Diff-in-Diff [s.e.] 0.830 [0.237] -0.001 [0.414] -0.020 [0.427]
Panel E: Hard work is important
Treatment group [obs.] 5.677 [164] 5.636 [44] 5.677 [96]
Control group [obs.] 5.711 [152] 5.744 [39] 6.108 [83]
Difference [s.e.] -0.034 [0.133] -0.107 [0.309] -0.431** [0.189]
Diff-in-Diff [s.e.] 0.045 [0.197] 0.013 [0.458] 0.007 [0.272]
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p < 0.01, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗: p < 0.1.
Dependent variable: preferences for redistribution. Columns show average preferences
for redistribution by bias group. Respondents with negative [positive] bias underestimate
[overestimate] their relative income rank. Initial preferences for less redistribution indicate
an initial preference lower or equal to 4. Above average bias indicates a bias above mean
bias (positive bias > 2.5; negative bias <−2.8).
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we have.
In Panel C we restrict attention to respondents who initially held a large (i.e., above-average)
bias, as these individuals might have had much reason to change their views, becoming aware
of their great knowledge gap. Here, the first difference estimator in column (3) reports a
statistically significant difference of stated preferences between control and treatment group,
which vanishes, however, when diff-in-diff is implemented. That the first difference is non-
zero in a statistically significant way is, thus, likely to be an artefact of having systematic
differences among those members in treatment and control group who held a positive bias.
Respondents with a leftist leaning (Panel D) do not show any treatment effect either. Neither
do those who attach great importance to hard work, i.e. who (initially) considered the process
of income generation as fair (Panel E). With exception of column 1 in Panel D, all diff-in-diff
coefficients are not just statistically insignificant but close to zero, too.
Hence, overall preferences for redistribution proved to be immune against our informative
update. Still, 26 % of treatment group members change their preferences upon treatment
(only 14 % in the control group). Thus, we indeed observe a higher variation of preferences
in the treatment group, but the difference is not statistically significant.13 By design, we can-
not say why the treatment was ineffective: according to knowledge-behavior gap theory (see
Section 4.2), it might not have changed individuals’ perceptions or, if it did, did not trans-
late into changes in preferences for redistribution. Within the short time span of the survey,
respondents may fail to update their beliefs on inequality or might not see enough reason
to give up cherished views on the social meaning of inequality. Neither do we observe any
impact of the respondents’ degree of confidence in their initial self-assessment on their dis-
position to change (or not to change) their views towards redistribution after the information
treatment.14
4.6 Perceived and preferred types of society
The dimensions of inequality discussed so far refer to a comparative view. We now examine
perceptions and preferences for a different concept of inequality – social stratification –,
based on a normative view of inequality. In a stylized way, the degree of social stratification
13From a technical point of view, the missing treatment effect is no surprise. Mean preferences for redis-
tribution are uniformly distributed over income deciles. Thus, if we inform respondents about their self-
positioning bias, the decile changes do not imply different preferences on average (see Table 4.A3).
14Whether a respondent was initially wrong (and might, thus, have felt uncomfortable with the initial view or
its correction) or right (and might, thus, feel encouraged to reinforce the initial view) does not play any
role. Neither does the specific way in which biases are measured. See Table 4.A9 Panel A in the Appendix.
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in a society can be depicted by simple graphs. As in the ISSP questionnaire, we presented
five types of society to our respondents (see Figure 4.2) and asked them to state (a) which
type best describes German society today and (b) of which type they think Germany ought
to be.
Figure 4.2: Types of society. Source: ISSP 2009 Social Inequality IV questionnaire.
4.6.1 Perceptions and preferences
Interpreting the society types in Figure 4.2 as representations of the income distribution, the
type which best describes today’s Germany is Type C. When asked about the actual type
of the Germany society at the beginning of the survey, 29 % of respondents opted for Type
C [see column (1) in Table 4.5]. About 57 % chose one of the more unequal Types A or
B, and 15 % thought it was one of the more equal Types D or E. For reference, a random
choice among these five types of society would lead to the right answer in 20 % of the time,
i.e., the majority of respondents misjudge social stratification. Interestingly, they tend to
overestimate inequality.15
If we turn to the ‘What do you think Germany ought to be like’- question the picture reverses:
more than 80 % of respondents think that the rather equal Types D and E are desirable [see
column (1) in Table 4.6]. About 10 % vouch for Type C and a mere 7 % prefer the rather
unequal Types A and B.
15Verify from column (1) in Table 4.A5 that responses in our sample are in line with those in the ISSP 2009.
The same holds for the ‘ought’-question; see column (2) in Table 4.A5.
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4.6.2 Information treatment
Our treatment does not inform respondents about the actual type of the German society but
only provides additional information about the income distribution. Still, this could have
helped treated participants to improve their assessments. We therefore asked both the ‘is’
and the ‘ought’ question on stratification again, after the treatment. As can be seen from
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 there are indeed small differences between treatment group [column (2)]
and control group [column (3)].
Table 4.5: What type of society is Germany today?
(1) (2) (3)
initial 1st treatment 1st treatment
type today (treated) (control)
Type A 21.65% 26.34% 21.90%
Type B 34.92% 29.91% 32.36%
Type C 28.52% 27.23% 30.90%
Type D 10.71% 11.83% 9.49%
Type E 4.19% 4.69% 5.35%
Table 4.6: What do you think Germany ought to be like?
(1) (2) (3)
initial 1st treatment 1st treatment
type preferred (treated) (control)
Type A 1.86% 2.01% 1.48%
Type B 5.01% 4.91% 6.42%
Type C 10.48% 13.39% 12.10%
Type D 63.33% 62.28% 60.49%
Type E 19.32% 17.41% 19.51%
For a more detailed analysis of these differences we again estimated first differences and
difference in differences. Tables 4.A6 and 4.A7 in the Appendix show the results for, re-
spectively, the ‘is’-question and the ‘ought’-question.16 They convey similar messages as
Table 4.4 in the previous section: there are no significant differences between treatment and
control group, and the full sample specification coefficients are also close to zero. This
holds irrespective of whether individuals overestimated, correctly estimated or underesti-
16As in Section 4.5, results are presented by bias group because of potentially heterogeneous treatment effects.
Furthermore, we ran estimates for each ‘before treatment’-type and for the full sample. Diff-in-diff is only
applied in the latter case, because both methods – first difference and diff-in-diff – obviously coincide in
the former ones.
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mated their income position, prior to the treatment. Hence, we were either unable to alter
our respondents’ beliefs or changes in beliefs did not translate into changes in preferences.
4.7 Net contributor or beneficiary?
In a second treatment, we triggered pocketbook concerns. In the spirit of rational choice-
approaches to income redistribution as in Meltzer and Richard (1981), the idea was to check
whether learning that one belongs to the net payers or net beneficiaries in the German tax-
transfer system affects one’s views on redistribution. For example, high-income earners who
tend to underestimate their relative position might change their preference for more redis-
tribution once they get informed that they would financially suffer from further inequality
reduction.
The treatment informs individuals about their ‘payer status’ where we (generously) described
individuals up to the 65th percentile as ‘net receivers’, individuals between the 65th and
75th percentile as ‘rather neutral’, and individuals above the 75th percentile of the income
distribution as ‘net payers’; these brackets were calculated from GSOEP data by subtracting
(equivalized) net incomes from (equivalized) market incomes. While learning their rank in
the income distribution in the first treatment – as well as in Cruces et al. (2013) and Karadja
et al. (2017) – might provide respondents with a rough idea on whether they benefit or suffer
from the tax-transfer system, our second treatment captures this more directly.
Since treatment effects are likely to be heterogeneous again (e.g. they might vary with payer
status), we generate dummy variable pay which takes value 1 if the respondent belongs to
the seventh decile or higher and zero otherwise.17 About 34 % of the (treated) respondents
are the net payers. Among these, 94 % underestimated their relative position in the income
distribution, 4 % held no bias and 2 % overestimated their relative income.
The second information treatment was only (randomly) applied to those in the previous treat-
ment group, i.e., all individuals knew about their relative income position. Therefore, our
empirical analysis focuses on the first difference between stated preferences before and after
the second information treatment.
Regressing this difference in preferences on pay provides a statistically highly significant
coefficient of negative sign, as can be seen in column (1) of Table 4.7: learning to be a net
17We used the 70th percentile rather than the more precise 75th percentile as the threshold because we framed
the entire survey in deciles (e.g., respondents were informed that they belonged to the seventh or eighth
decile). Our results also hold if we set the threshold at the eighth decile.
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payer decreases one’s preference for redistribution.
Interestingly, this change of mind occurs irrespective of respondents’ political leanings and
fairness perceptions: the sign and magnitude of preference changes when being informed
about one’s net payer status do not vary when we control for political attitudes and the hard
work-variable [see columns (2) and (3) in Table 4.7].
Table 4.7: Net payer/beneficiary and preferences for redistribution
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
pay -0.251*** (0.001) -0.251*** (0.073) -0.257*** (0.073)
hard work -0.087 (0.074)
ideology 0.017 (0.018)
constant -0.078* (0.042) -0.019 (0.066) -0.160 (0.101)
R2 0.026 0.029 0.028
N 448 448 448
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗∗∗: p < 0.01, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗: p < 0.1.
Dependent variable: change in preferences which is defined as after-treatment preference
minus before-treatment preferences. See Table A.1 for detailed definitions.
In summary, learning that they are richer or poorer than they had previously thought has no
effect on individuals’ demand for redistribution – but learning that they are likely to lose
from redistribution does decrease their demand. A potential explanation (beyond the scope
of our survey) is that, unless primed so, people do not think about redistribution in terms
of financial costs and benefits but in general and principled terms of good or fair societies.
At this abstract level, the own income position might not matter much when assessing the
status quo and expressing a normative view, leading to a weak correlation between income
rank and preferences. Once the veil of ignorance is lifted – which happens in the second
information treatment – pocketbook concerns set in.
The initial information treatment had no effect: those who learn (or are assured) that they
are relatively rich obviously did not consider or grasp the personal financial implications of
this (new) information. This might be understandable, given that at this stage of the survey
the financing of the welfare state had not played any role at all. Once the (personalized)
price tag on redistribution becomes salient, rich respondents partly re-consider their policy
preferences.
The inertia most (rich) respondents show after the first treatment and their preference shift
after the second are in line with a ‘cheap talk’-interpretation of preferences towards redistri-
bution: people hold cherished views on how large inequality is and ought to be, and they do
not change these ‘expressive’ views until they are given reason to think through its conse-
61
4 What do Germans think and know about income inequality?
quences for themselves.
4.8 Conclusions
All in all, our results show that Germans are poorly informed about their own relative in-
come, that their perception of social stratification is just slightly better, and that they are
aware of their ignorance. Still, they have outspoken preferences for more redistribution. A
surprising observation from our survey is the stable and strong preferences for more redis-
tribution across all incomes.18 This is in contrast to what one would expect, in particular
towards the top of the income distribution and in a country that, in international comparison,
a large welfare state with a considerable degree of progressivity.
Part of the puzzle might be resolved when noticing that the average survey participant from
income deciles 8 to 10 locates herself between deciles 5 and 6 and, thus, holds a massively
negative self-perception bias. Obviously, these comparatively rich people believe that there
is a considerable share of the population with (even) higher incomes – and that there are,
thus, substantial resources available that could be redistributed downwards. Hence, addi-
tional redistribution looks easily feasible. Moreover, underestimating their relative position,
the upper income groups might not think of themselves as massive net contributors to redis-
tributive schemes (some might even hope to benefit financially from redistribution), which
makes a greater degree egalitarianism appear costless to themselves.19
Given their preference for more redistribution we expected that it would be mainly those
relatively rich respondents who underestimate their actual income position who reacted to
the information treatment by expressing lower enthusiasm for redistribution. This did not
happen, however. A tentative explanation – apart from the possibility that the information
treatment did not help respondents to better understand inequality – would be that high-
income earners indeed harbor sincere egalitarian or pro-poor preferences. Inferring from
the information treatment how big the gap between rich and poor in Germany actually is
or how low incomes in the poorer strata really are, might strengthen their desire for more
redistribution, even after taking potential pocketbook concerns into account.
Our results trigger the question why we do not observe more redistribution, given that all
18By contrast, Cruces et al. (2013, Figure 4) find a u-shaped pattern in the preference for more redistribution
over the Argentinian income distribution.
19Observe from Table 4.3 that some respondents who believe to belong to the top deciles of the income distri-
bution indeed do ask for more redistribution (38 respondents locating themselves in the eighth decile, four
in the ninth, and eight in the top). Still there is no bias resulting from a potentially above-average leftist
ideology in this sub-sample.
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Germans seem to cherish it. Tentative answers are: first, the preference for more egalitar-
ianism (which also shows up in the platforms of all major political parties in Germany) is
mostly cheap talk – if programs are actually proposed, pocketbook concerns override well-
intentioned preference statements. Our experiment supports this explanation: already infor-
mational clues towards net payer status weaken the preference for redistribution noticeably.
Second, the ‘political system’ (government, parliament, lobby groups etc.) holds different
preferences on redistribution than the citizenry. As there is no direct voting (on redistribu-
tion) in Germany, political processes might produce results that deviate from what a popular
vote would dictate. Third, financial feasibility and government budget constraints limit the
scope for more redistribution, even if it is wished for by voters.
(Mis-)Perceptions of reality in the citizenry matter in democracies: normative views on the
desirability (or lack thereof) of policy changes – more or less redistribution, say – are shaped,
among others, by perceptions of the status quo. Distorted perceptions might lead to biased
political choices. The links between citizens’ views and preferences and actual redistribution
policies certainly deserve greater attention.
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4.9 Appendix
Table 4.A1: Comparison of survey respondents and population
(1) (2)
Survey Census (2011)
Mean Std. Err. Mean
age (18-70) 45.2 (14.541) 44.2
women 0.505 (0.500) 0.512
household net income (monthly) 2405 (2319) 2988
primary education 0.002 (0.048) 0.047
lower secondary education 0.112 (0.315) 0.356
secondary education 0.359 (0.480) 0.269
higher secondary education 0.527 (0.500) 0.283
retired 0.212 (0.409) 0.237
Source: Own survey and micro census 2011.
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Table 4.A2: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
equiv. household net income (Monthly) Net income divided by equivalence weight 1461.25 745.88
based on the modified OECD scale.
objective income decile Respondent’s relative income rank corresponding 4.960 2.886
to the deciles of the GSOEP v29 (equivalence weighted).
perceived own income decile Respondent’s stated perceived own decile. 4.184 1.998
Survey question: What is the share of households
in Germany that have a lower standard of living than yours?
Answer categories were given in deciles.
bias Perceived own income decile minus objective income decile. -0.774 2.781
preference for redistribution Respondent’s stated attitude towards 5.651 1.341
actual income inequality (scale ranges from 1 to 7):
(1) there is too much effort to equalize incomes,
(4) satisfied with status quo,
(7) there should be much more effort to equalize incomes.
type today Survey question: Which type (see Figure 4.2) 2.409 1.069
best describes German society today?
(1) Type A, (2) Type B, (3) Type C, (4) Type D, (5) Type E.
preferred type Survey question: Which type (see Figure 4.2) 3.932 0.814
the German society ought to be like?
(1) Type A, (2) Type B, (3) Type C, (4) Type D, (5) Type E.
pay Indicator variable equal to 1 if respondents 0.341 0.474
objective income decile is 7 or higher.
informed Sum of respondents stated (news) media consumption. 12.744 2.287
We asked for news in TV, internet and newspaper,
response categories: (1) never, (2) seldom, (3) monthly,
(4) weekly, (5) daily.
confidence How confident respondent feels with her answer 1.790 0.757
on the own income decile
(1) not sure, (2) somewhat sure, (3) sure, (4) very sure
confident Indicator variable equal to 1 if 0.618 0.486
confidence is (2), (3), or (4)
reference group Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent states
that she hast friends from all social classes.
ideology Respondent’s stated political leaning on a range 5.013 1.875
from (1) left to (10) right
left Indicator variable equal to 1 if ideology is equal or lower (4) 0.484 0.500
hard work Indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent states 0.675 0.469
that hard work is important to get ahead in live.
Survey question: How important is hard work to get ahead
in live?: (1) essential, (2) very important, (3) important,
(4) somewhat important, (5) not important.
age Age in years. 45.213 14.541
women Indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent is female. 0.505 0.500
education respondent’s highest degree: 3.794 1.081
(1) primary education, (2) lower secondary education,
(3) secondary education, (4) higher secondary education
(Fachhochschulreife), (5) higher secondary education (Abitur)
Notes: N = 859 for all variables.
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Table 4.A3: (Mean) Preferences for redistribution by income decile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
initial 1st treatment 1st treatment 2nd treatment
preferences (treated) (control) (of the treated)
decile Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
1 5.801 (1.410) 5.920 (1.217) 5.831 (1.485) 5.813 (1.302)
2 6.011 (1.260) 5.867 (1.198) 6.022 (1.252) 5.756 (1.417)
3 5.670 (1.367) 5.551 (1.355) 5.976 (1.129) 5.449 (1.542)
4 5.904 (1.238) 5.750 (1.368) 6.024 (0.987) 5.656 (1.405)
5 5.663 (1.184) 5.556 (1.120) 6.025 (0.974) 5.600 (1.031)
6 5.500 (1.303) 5.780 (1.250) 5.529 (1.107) 5.700 (1.233)
7 5.573 (1.248) 5.762 (1.246) 5.718 (1.169) 5.476 (1.348)
8 5.453 (1.621) 5.523 (1.577) 5.595 (1.547) 5.136 (1.564)
9 5.520 (1.107) 5.571 (0.966) 5.606 (1.059) 5.143 (1.458)
10 5.060 (1.420) 5.292 (1.083) 5.230 (1.306) 5.167 (1.167)
Notes: Preferences for redistribution are coded from 1 to 7. For more details see Table A.1.
Table 4.A4: (Mean) Preferences for redistribution: ISSP 2009
(1) (2) (3)
Germany Argentina Sweden
perceived decile Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
1 4.750 (0.866) 4.310 (0.541) 4.636 (0.505)
2 4.667 (0.620) 4.167 (0.794) 4.385 (0.768)
3 4.713 (0.580) 4.339 (0.712) 4.236 (0.860)
4 4.600 (0.670) 4.274 (0.676) 4.395 (0.786)
5 4.460 (0.720) 4.236 (0.738) 4.157 (0.837)
6 4.351 (0.810) 4.168 (0.833) 3.987 (0.868)
7 4.184 (0.876) 4.286 (0.749) 3.600 (1.068)
8 4.071 (0.956) 4.436 (0.640) 3.518 (1.210)
9 4.071 (1.141) 4.222 (0.833) 3.455 (1.368)
10 4.500 (1.000) 5.000 (0.000) 3.571 (1.505)
Source: ISSP 2009 Social Inequality IV.
Notes: Preferences for redistribution are coded from 1 to 5. survey question: ‘Dif-
ferences in income in <R’s country> are too large.’ (5) strongly agree (4) agree (3)
neither agree nor disagree (2) disagree (1) strongly disagree. See Engelhardt and
Wagener (2014) for the perceived income decile in the ISSP.
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Table 4.A5: Answers ISSP 2009 (for Ger-
many)
(1) (2)
Type Today Type Preferred
Type A 18.80% 1.49%
Type B 35.38% 10.36%
Type C 23.03% 18.21%
Type D 18.57% 57.06%
Type E 4.22% 12.87%
N 1,255 1,274
Source: ISSP 2009 Social Inequality
IV.
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Figure 4.A1: Distribution of variable bias in our sample (see Table A.1 for definition).
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Table 4.A6: Perceived types today: experimental results
(1) (2) (3)
Negative Bias No Bias Positive Bias
Type A
Treatment group [obs.] 1.264 [53] 1.111 [18] 1.394 [33]
Control group [obs.] 1.200 [40] 1.467 [15] 1.222 [27]
Difference [s.e.] 0.064 [0.143] -0.356 [0.277] 0.172 [0.227]
Type B
Treatment group [obs.] 2.107 [75] 2.154 [26] 2.220 [50]
Control group [obs.] 2.025 [79] 1.957 [23] 2.149 [47]
Difference [s.e.] 0.081 [0.107] 0.197 [0.188] 0.071 [0.182]
Type C
Treatment group [obs.] 2.868 [76] 2.867 [15] 2.939 [33]
Control group [obs.] 3.000 [76] 2.833 [24] 2.857 [21]
Difference [s.e.] -0.132 [0.870] 0.033 [0.180] 0.082 [0.166]
Type D
Treatment group [obs.] 3.541 [37] 3.625 [8] 3.889 [9]
Control group [obs.] 3.905 [21] 3.750 [4] 3.769 [13]
Difference [s.e.] -0.364* [0.190] -0.125 [0.314] 0.120 [0.352]
Type E
Treatment group [obs.] 4.714 [7] 3.500 [2] 3.000 [6]
Control group [obs.] 4.500 [8] 5.000 [2] 4.182 [11]
Difference [s.e.] 0.214 [0.564] -1.500 [1.500] -1.182 [0.846]
Full Sample
Treatment group [obs.] 2.448 [248] 2.246 [69] 2.344 [131]
Control group [obs.] 2.473 [224] 2.353 [68] 2.429 [119]
Difference [s.e.] -0.026 [0.100] -0.107 [0.179] -0.085 [0.154]
Diff-in-Diff [s.e.] -0.046 [0.138] -0.044 [0.251] 0.086 [0.211]
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗∗∗: p < 0.01, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗: p < 0.1.
Dependent variable: type today. Columns show average preferences for redostribution
by bias group. Respondents with negative [positive] bias underestimate [overestimate]
their relaitve income rank.
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Table 4.A7: Preferred society types: experimental results
(1) (2) (3)
Negative Bias No Bias Positive Bias
Type A
Treatment group [obs.] 1.000 [2] —— [——] 1.625 [8]
Control group [obs.] 1 [2] 1.000 [1] 2.333 [3]
Difference [s.e.] —— [——] —— [——] —— [——]
Type B
Treatment group [obs.] 2.500 [10] 3.000 [2] 2.462 [13]
Control group [obs.] 2.000 [11] 2.000 [2] 2.000 [5]
Difference [s.e.] 0.500* [0.256] —— [——] 0.462 [0.400]
Type C
Treatment group [obs.] 3.148 [27] 3.375 [8] 3.000 [13]
Control group [obs.] 2.947 [19] 3.143 [7] 3.143 [14]
Difference [s.e.] 0.201 [0.145] 0.232 [0.312] -0.143 [0.101]
Type D
Treatment group [obs.] 3.927 [164] 3.957 [46] 3.946 [74]
Control group [obs.] 3.918 [147] 4.024 [41] 3.956 [68]
Difference [s.e.] 0.008 [0.043] -0.068 [0.090] -0.010 [0.058]
Type E
Treatment group [obs.] 4.867 [45] 4.769 [13] 4.826 [23]
Control group [obs.] 4.707 [41] 4.750 [16] 4.750 [28]
Difference [s.e.] 0.159 [0.128] 0.019 [0.242] 0 .076 [0.182]
Full Sample
Treatment group [obs.] 3.931 [248] 4.014 [69] 3.718 [131]
Control group [obs.] 3.860 [220] 4.000 [67] 3.924 [118]
Difference [s.e.] 0.072 [0.072] 0.014 [0.130] -0.206* [0.118]
Diff-in-Diff [s.e.] 0.069 [0.099] 0.029 [0.178] 0.057 [0.171]
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗∗∗: p < 0.01, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗: p < 0.1.
Dependent variable: type preferred. Columns show average preferences for redistribu-
tion by bias group. Respondents with negative [positive] bias underestimate [overesti-
mate] their relative income rank.
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Table 4.A8: Preferences for redistribution and perceived/preferred types of society: weighted
sample
(1) (2) (3)
Negative Bias No Bias Positive Bias
Panel A: Preferences for redistribution
Treatment group [obs.] 5.604 [248] 5.680 [69] 5.688 [131]
Control group [obs.] 5.609 [220] 5.940 [68] 5.936 [118]
Difference [s.e.] -0.005 [0.135] -0.260 [0.237] -0.248 [0.173]
Diff-in-Diff [s.e.] 0.066 [0.198] -0.021 [0.353] 0.012 [0.249]
Panel B: Perceived types of society today
Treatment group [obs.] 2.479 [248] 2.220 [69] 2.402 [131]
Control group [obs.] 2.513 [224] 2.396 [68] 2.363 [119]
Difference [s.e.] -0.034 [0.112] -0.176 [0.187] 0.039 [0.157]
Diff-in-Diff [s.e.] -0.087 [0.154] -0.024 [0.261] 0.143 [0.216]
Panel C: Preferred types of society
Treatment group [obs.] 3.942 [248] 3.997 [69] 3.709 [131]
Control group [obs.] 3.835 [220] 4.056 [67] 3.921 [118]
Difference [s.e.] 0.107 [0.076] -0.059 [0.195] -0.212 [0.130]
Diff-in-Diff [s.e.] 0.044 [0.105] 0.049 [0.270] 0.041 [0.187]
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p < 0.01, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗: p <
0.1. Regressions in Panel A recap regressions from Panel A in Table 4 but use sample
weights. Panel B is the sample-weights analogue to Table A.6 (full sample). Panel C is
the (sample weights) analogue to Table A.7 (full sample).
70
4 What do Germans think and know about income inequality?
Table 4.A9: Changes of preferences for redistribution after treatment
Panel A: Changes of preferences for redistribution after 1st treatment
(1) (2) (3)
positive bias -0.005 (0.111) -0.007 (0.112) -0.007 (0.112)
negative bias 0.130 (0.103) 0.131 (0.103) 0.129 (0.103)
nonconfident – -0.045 (0.076) -0.045 (0.076)
ideology – – 0.005 (0.019)
socio-economic
controls X X X
constant 0.516** (0.241) 0.527** (0.242) 0.497* (0.266)
N 448 448 448
R2 0.022 0.023 0.023
Panel B: Changes of preferences for redistribution after 2nd treatment
(1) (2) (3)
pay -0.207** (0.090) -0.206** (0.091) -0.213** (0.091)
positive bias -0.143 (0.109) -0.142 (0.109) -0.145 (0.109)
negative bias -0.179 (0.109) -0.180* (0.109) -0.184* (0.109)
nonconfident – 0.011 (0.075) 0.011 (0.075)
ideology – – 0.018 (0.019)
socio-economic
controls X X X
constant -0.054 (0.239) -0.056 (0.240) -0.163 (0.263)
N 448 448 448
R2 0.033 0.033 0.035
Panel C: Preference changes after 2nd treatment – alternative definitions of biases and interaction effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pay -0.181* (0.102) -0.179* (0.103) -0.189* (0.104) -0.257* (0.150)
positive bias
(no dummy) -0.042 (0.029) -0.041 (0.029) -0.0415 (0.029) -0.046 (0.031)
interaction 1 – – – 0.639 (0.444)
negative bias
(no dummy) 0.043 (0.0.027) 0.044 (0.028) -0.043 (0.027) 0.048 (0.045)
interaction 2 – – – -0.021 (0.057)
nonconfident – 0.010 (0.075) 0.009 (0.075) 0.003 (0.075)
ideology – – 0.017 (0.019) 0.017 (0.019)
socio-economic
controls X X X X
constant -0.079 (0.233) -0.081 (0.234) -0.180 (0.259) -0.155 (0.261)
N 448 448 448 448
R2 0.035 0.035 0.037 0.041
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p < 0.01, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗: p < 0.1. All estimations are based
on the treatment group sample. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are the differences in the preference for
redistribution after and before, respectively, treatment 1 and treatment 2; positive values indicate increased preference
of redistribution. In Panels A and B ‘no bias’-respondents are the reference group of bias types. Interaction 1 (2) is
the coefficient resulting from interacting pay and positive (negative) bias. Socio-economic controls are age, sex, and
education level.
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Figure 4.A2: Germans mean preferences for redistribution by perceived income decile.
Note: Comparison of ISSP and authors’ survey Preferences are normalized to
[1,7].
Figure 4.A3: Mean preferences for redistribution by perceived income decile.
Notes: Comparison of ISSP and authors’ survey. Preferences are normalized
to [1,7].
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Figure 4.A4: Mean change in preferences for redistribution by initial self-positioning bias.
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5 Unemployment and personality:
Are conscientiousness and
agreeableness related to
employability?1
5.1 Introduction
There is a broad consensus that cognitive skills und labor market outcomes are closely con-
nected (Heckman et al., 2006). Meanwhile, there is growing consensus that noncognitive
skills are relevant, too. An increasing literature shows a relationship between noncognitive
skills and different work related outcomes.2.
Noncognitive skills have been shown to influence occupational choice (Barrick and Mount,
1991; Cobb-Clark and Tan, 2011; Wells et al., 2016), job performance and income (Bar-
rick and Mount, 1991; Dohmen et al., 2009; Heineck and Anger, 2010; Mueller and Plug,
2006; Nyhus and Pons, 2005; Semykina and Linz, 2007), absence probability (Störmer and
Fahr, 2013), the duration of unemployment spells (Caliendo et al., 2015; Cuesta and Budría,
2017; Egan et al., 2017; McGee, 2015; Uysal and Pohlmeier, 2011), and the probability of
unemployment (Egan et al., 2017).
As it is often done in economics, the term ‘noncognitive skills’ is used synonymously to
personality in this paper. Across disciplines, there are different ways to conceptualize a per-
son’s personality, but the most established model of personality is the ‘Big Five’ framework
proposed by Costa and McCrae (1992). This framework is based on the finding that - for
most purposes - five dimensions are enough to approximate an individual’s personality. The
five dimensions are extraversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness to experience
1An earlier version of this chapter is available as Discussion Paper No. 621 of the Hannover Economic Papers
series.
2See Almlund et al. (2011); Borghans et al. (2008); Thiel and Thomsen (2013) for a review of the literature.
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and neuroticism. See Almlund et al. (2011, Table 3) for an overview of the Big Five.
Why should personality traits influence labor market outcomes? The intuition is that indi-
viduals always have to exert some costly effort to achieve a certain outcome level.
The effort necessary to achieve a certain outcome level depends on personality traits. Some-
times the costs (of needed effort) exceed the utility of the resulting outcome level for some
personality profiles. These individuals need additional extrinsic motivation to exert enough
effort to achieve a certain outcome level. Job related tasks, for example, sometimes require
some cooperation. Being a cooperative teamplayer demands less effort from an individual
who is more agreeable as from someone who scores lower in the dimension agreeableness.
But not just the effort necessary might be different. Also intrinsic motivation (utility of the
resulting outcome) might differ. This is consistent with the finding that high scorers in con-
scientiousness gain greater satisfaction from work. Their life satisfaction also responds more
sensitively to the experience of unemployment. This finding suggests that conscientious in-
dividuals might be more (intrinsically) motivated to be a good employee (Boyce and Wood,
2011; Boyce et al., 2010; Judge et al., 2002).
The literature on personality and labor market outcomes generally agrees that conscientious-
ness is the most important personality trait for predicting several labor market outcomes
(Cuesta and Budría, 2017; Egan et al., 2017; Fletcher, 2013, amongst others). This is quite
intuitive, because individuals scoring low in conscientiousness are unconcerned and careless,
while high scorers in this dimension are effective and organized.
A positive correlation between agreeableness, conscientiousness, and labor market outcomes
also has been shown by the literature on organizational citizenship behavior (for a review see
Podsakoff et al., 2000). While low scorers in agreeableness are competitve and antagonistic,
high scorer are cooperative, friendly and sympathetic. Agreeableness is positively related to
organisational citizenship which sum up behavioral aspects and social cohesion. Organisa-
tional citizenship behavior is not easy to measure and to compensate for. Nevertheless, it is
crucial for an organisation to function. Employers value conscientious employees for con-
sistently high level of work motivation. Thus, employees who score high in the dimensions
conscientiousness and agreeableness are of special value for employers (Podsakoff et al.,
2000).
Empirical evidence suggests that labor markets give an advantage to individuals with high
level of conscientiousness and agreeableness. Less conscious and agreeable individuals need
to make more effort to find and keep a suitable employment. The question is, whether the
welfare state lowers the extrinsic motivation for taking this effort. If this is true, the inhibi-
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tion threshold of being unemployed for low scorers in conscientiousness and agreeableness
is systematically lowered, and we should observe higher unemployment rates and unemploy-
ment durations.
Even if there is some literature which finds a significant correlation between the other Big
Five dimensions and labor market outcomes like wages and occupational choice, we focus
on the dimensions concientiousness and agreeableness, here. We do this, because stud-
ies investigating the association between Big Five personality traits and unemployment find
significant associations between unemployment on the one side and conscientiousness and
agreeableness on the other side only (Cuesta and Budría, 2017; Egan et al., 2017; Fletcher,
2013).
We assume that low levels of agreeableness are outweighed by a high level of conscien-
tiousness or vice versa. Thus, individuals who score low in both dimensions are particularly
disadvantaged at the labor market and have a higher risk of being permant or again and again
unemployed. This is why we use a definition of personality which combines conscientious-
ness and agreeableness. This combined personality trait is called AC-score in the following.
We will use the terms noncognitive skills, personality, and AC-score synonymously.
For investigating whether AC-scores and unemployment are correlated two types of unem-
ployed are distinguished. First, individuals with long unemployment spells are of interest,
and second, we are also interested in individuals who often switch between unemployment
and employment. The risk of unemployment and educational attainment are negatively cor-
related, and educational achievements also depend on personality (Almlund et al., 2011;
Cunha et al., 2010). Thus, the indirect influence of personality on welfare recipient status is
well established. This paper will examine whether there is a direct effect of personality on
welfare recipient status, too. This would mean that personality influences welfare recipient
status beyond its effect through educational attainment. For measuring the direct effect an
factor analytic approach is needed (see amongst others Almlund et al., 2011; Borghans et al.,
2008; Heckman et al., 2006). Here, a latent structure model3 is used to infer cognitive and
noncognitive factor scores. We refer to this approach in more detail in section 5.3.2
The intuition that low scorers in concientiousness and agreeableness struggle at the labor
market is not novel, but it is also a part of the Welfare Trait theory proposed by Perkins
(2016). He underpins his argumentation with a number of evidence based on diverse method-
ologies. Brain injuries case studies show, that reductions in the levels of conscientiousness
and agreeableness decrease employability (Blummer and Benson, 1975; Damasio, 1994).
Perkins (2016) also presents longitudinal studies which show that personality measured in
3Also known as confirmatory factor analysis.
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childhood predicts occupational outcomes in adulthood (Moffitt et al., 2011). Literature on
troubled families shows that adults of the troubled families, on average, possess lower levels
of conscientiousness and agreeableness than adults of control families. These differences in
personality go hand in hand with significantly worse work records (Tonge et al., 1975, 1981).
Perkins (2016) concludes that the methodological diverse evidence on the relationship be-
tween agreeableness and conscientiousness on the one side and employability at the other
side suggests that they are indeed connected. But an exhaustive empirical exploration of this
hypothesis does - to the best of our knowledge - not exist, yet.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 reviews the related literature. Section 5.3
presents the data and the factor analytic approach. Section 5.4 presents empirical strategies
and results. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Related literature
Egan et al. (2017) study the influence of pre-labor market measures of Big Five personal-
ity traits on the risk of unemployment. Their results show that conscientiousness - and no
other Big Five personality trait - in adolescence indeed predict future unemployment. Even
the inclusion of two additional education variables (academic motivation and educational as-
sessment at age 26 and 30) to account for possible pathways between the adolescent level of
conscientiousness and the future risk of unemployment does not change results qualitatively.
Their results also suggest that low levels of conscientiouness matter more for job keeping
than for job finding.
Cuesta and Budría (2017) show that conscientiousness is negatively correlated with the prob-
ability of unemployment. Contrary to the hypothesis in this paper they find a positive link
between the risk of unemployment and agreeableness, but an intuitive explaination for this
result is not given. Interestingly, they find no significant role of the remaining Big Five per-
sonality traits4 in explaining unemployment transition. Cuesta and Budría (2017) also find
a negative correlation of positive reciprocity and risk of unemployment. As Dohmen et al.
(2008) show, agreeableness and conscientiousness are important determinants of positive
reciprocity.
Fletcher (2013) investigates the association between employment status at age 30 and the Big
Five personality traits. He estimates a sibling fixed effects model to control for individual
heterogeneity based on family background. After inclusion of family fixed effects he finds
4Namely neuroticism, extraversion, and openness.
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a positive association only between concientiousness and probability of being employed at
age 30.
Evaluations of early childhood intervention programs find an indirect association between
personality and unemployment. This interventions trained - amongst others - noncognitive
skills related to agreeableness and conscientiousness. These improvements of noncognitive
skills are longlasting and improve labor market outcomes. For an overview see Almlund
et al. (2011) and Kautz et al. (2014). This kind of literature hints at a causal channel from
personality to labor market outcomes. Nevertheless, it does not exclude that there is also a
channel in the opposite direction. But Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2012) find little evidence
that (economically meaningful) intra-individual personality change is related to adverse em-
ployment. Moreover, they show that Big Five personality traits seem to be relativly stable
among working age adults.
All of this studies show, that the Big Five dimensions concientiousness and agreeableness
are important determinants of unemployment probability and unemployment duration. Dif-
ferent empirical strategies were used to identify the relationship between personality traits
and unemployment. But none of these studies use a factor analytic approach to identify an
association between unemployment and personality beyond the channel of cognitive skills.
We complement existing literature by using a combined measure of both trais (the AC-
score) and by measuring the direct association between personality and unemployment - this
means the association beyond the channel of educational attainment - by using the concept
of factors. Economists adopt this approach from the psychological literature (Almlund et al.,
2011; Borghans et al., 2008; Cattan, 2010; Heckman et al., 2010, 2006). The latent factor
structure model used in this paper is described in Section 5.3.2. But first the data set and
sample are introduced in Section 5.3.1.
5.3 Data and measurement of cognitive and
noncognitve skills
5.3.1 Data and sample
To test whether or not there is an association between personality and unemployment sev-
eral variables are necessary. First, the AC-score has to be determinend. Hence, measures
for the Big Five dimensions concientiousness and agreeableness are needed. Moreover, we
differentiate several aspects of unemployment: unemployment risk, the duration of unem-
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ployment, and status changes between employment and unemployment. This measures and
socio-economic control variables are presented in the following.
Data is used from the German SOEP Panel5 (G-SOEP, v.30). Questions on Big Five Items
(BFI-S) were asked in waves 2005, 2009 and 2013. For each dimension there are three
questions and the questions for the dimensions conscientiousness and agreeableness read as
follows:
‘I see myself as someone who: (c1) is a thorough worker, (c2) tends to be lazy,
(c3) carry out tasks efficiently, (a1) is sometimes too coarse with others, (a2) is
able to forgive, and (a3) is friendly with others.’
Here, (c1) to (c3) refer to the dimension conscientiousness, and (a1) to (a3) refer to agree-
ableness. The questions consist of positive and negative statements refering to the Big Five
dimensions. Variables were constructed so that values (still) range from 1 to 7 but that higher
values always indicate higher level of agreeableness or conscientiousness, repectively. Mean
answers on these questions are about five. More detailed summary statistics can be found in
Table 5.A1 in the Appendix.
The sample is not only restricted to years 2005, 2009, and 2013 but also to respondents aged
between 18 and 65 years, because we are only interested in the population in working age.
Students and trainees are dropped, too. Moreover, we exclude individuals with officially
recognized reduction in earning capacity or severe disability. Thus, the sample consists of
individuals who are generally capable to work only. All in all, for regressions a balanced
panel is used which consists of 5163 individuals.
For cognitive skills three indicator variables were considered: school education (educ_s),
vocational education (educ_w), and the variable status, which differentiates between non-
working, blue-collar worker, white-collar worker, freelancer, and public servants. More de-
tailed information and summary statistics can be found in Table 5.A1 in the Appendix.
Several dependent variables were used to identify individuals who struggle with the labor
market.
First, the length of unemployment spell is used as a dependent variable. Respondents were
asked in each wave about their time spent unemployed in their lives up to this point. Of
course, the spell of unemployment is highly autocorrelated and cannot decrease over time.
Therefore, we use the difference between the spells of unemployment in 2013 and in 2009 as
5The G-SOEP is a representative longitudinal study that contains a large set of socio-economic, attitudinal,
and labor market characteristics of respondents.
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the dependent variable (∆unemployment(13−09)). This is just a second best measure of unem-
ployment duration, but if personality and unemployment duration are generally associated,
they should also be an association in each arbitrary time intervall. To decrease autocorrela-
tion the lagged dependent variable is included, too. For this, the difference between the spells
of unemployment in 2009 and in 2005 is used. This lowers autocorrelation remarkably. A
more detailed discussion can be found in Section 5.4.1.
Second, the probability of receiving welfare benefits6 is used as a dependent variable. In
style of the German social assistance system the variable is labeled as ALGII (see footnote 6
for an explanation).
Third, on-and-off welfare recipient status is used as dependent variable. The G-SOEP re-
ports - for each year - whether respondents are employed or unemployed. We construct a
variable which counts the number of status changes between 1984 and 2013. To achieve
inter-individual comparability we divided an individual’s total number of status changes by
her number of years included in the G-SOEP. Because of the yearly base the number of status
changes is underestimated.
Mean unemployment duration between 2009 and 2013 is two month. About 4 percent of
the sample receive unemployment benefits in 2013, and the mean (standardized) number of
status change is 0.05. More detailed information can be seen in Table 5.A1 in the Appendix.
Table 5.A1 also shows summary statistics of our socio-economic control variables. The
average age in the sample are 49.4 years and 45.3 percent of the sample is male. 94.7 percent
of the sample are German citizens.
5.3.2 Cognitive and noncognitive skills
It is not clear whether higher noncognitive ability causes lower probability of welfare de-
pendece or whether higher cognitive skills cause both higher noncognitive skills and lower
probability of welfare dependence. It might also be possible that higher noncognitive skills
favor higher cognitive skills, which lower probability of welfare dependence. The construc-
tion of factors enables us to cut the association between cognitive and noncognitive skills.
Both, cognitive and noncognitive skills are hypothetical constructs which cannot be asked
6In Germany, there is a system of social assistance for the case of unemployment. Individuals subject to social
insurance contribution for at least 12 month within the last two years receive (contribution-dependent)
Arbeitslosengeld I. Arbeitslosengeld I is payed for maximally 12 months, if available for the labor market.
An individual who is not or not anymore entitled to Arbeitslosengeld I receives Arbeitslosengeld II. Strictly
speaking, the second dependent variable is an indicator variable for receiving Arbeitslosengeld II.
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for directly. Therefore, measurement models were used to define relationships between ob-
served phenomena (called indicators, items, or manifest variables) and unobservabel con-
cepts (called factors or latent variables). The latent factor structure model (also called con-
firmatory factor analysis) is a common tool to test measurement models for hypothetical
constructs. In contrast to explanatory factor analysis, latent factor structure models allow
inference about the estimated latent factors (Thiel and Thomsen, 2013). See Brown (2014)
for an introduction into latent factor structure mode. Explanations in this paper are based on
Backhaus et al. (2015).
In this paper, noncognitive skills are presented by the AC-score. Individuals scoring low in
both concientiousness and agreeableness are assumed to struggle at the labor market and have
a higher risk of being unemployed. Thus, the indicators for the hypothetical construct AC-
score are the indicator variables intended to map the Big Five dimension conscientiousness
and agreeableness. For agreeableness these are variables a1 to a3 introduced in Section 5.3.1.
For conscientiousness these are variable c1 to c3 introduced in Section 5.3.1, too.
Indicators of cognitive skills are school education, voacational education and the status of the
current job (the distinction between non-working, blue-collar worker, white-collar worker,
freelancer, and public servants).
The measurement model is assumend to be reflective. Thus, we assume a high correlation
between indicator variables which is caused by the corresponding latent variable (=factor).
That means that the AC-score is the driving force of the correlation between all indicator vari-
ables a1 to c3. Accordingly, the factor cognitive drives the correlation between the indicator
variables school education, voacational education and the status of the current job.
The factor analysis now uses the correlations of indicator variables to estimates individual
values (called factor scores) for the factors AC-score and cognitive. To disentangle the effects
of cognitive and noncognitive skills it is common to assume both factors to be orthogonal
(Heckman et al., 2006; Thiel and Thomsen, 2013).
Here, the measurement model for individual k is described by the following equations:
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educ_wk = λ11 · cognitivek + ε1k (5.1)
educ_sk = λ21 · cognitivek + ε2k (5.2)
statusk = λ31 · cognitivek + ε3k (5.3)
a_1k = λ42 ·AC-scorek + ε4k (5.4)
a_2k = λ52 ·AC-scorek + ε5k (5.5)
a_3k = λ62 ·AC-scorek + ε6k (5.6)
c_1k = λ72 ·AC-scorek + ε7k (5.7)
c_2k = λ82 ·AC-scorek + ε8k (5.8)
c_3k = λ92 ·AC-scorek + ε9k (5.9)
where λi j (i = 1, ...,9; j = 1,2) measures the correlation between the i-th indicator variable
and factor j. This correlation is called factor loading.
The confirmatory factor analysis estimates coefficients of the theoretical variance-covariance
matrix of the measurement model. Because standardized values of all variables are used
(mean=0, sd=1) the variance-covariance matrix is equal to the correlation matrix.
It is assumed that factors, factors and disturbance terms εik, and disturbance terms εik are
uncorrelated. The assumption of uncorrelated factors is what cuts the association between
cognitive and noncognitive skills, here. A theoretical derivation of the correlation matrix can
be found in the Appendix.
In practice, measurement models are overidentified and an iterative algorithm is used to
minimize the discrepancy function of empirical and theoretical correlation matrix. In this
paper the Maximum-Likelihood-Method (ML) is used7.
Correlation matrix estimation yields results for factor loadings λi j and disturbance terms εik.
Indicator variable values are given in the data set. Thus, rearranging equations (5.1) to (5.9)
allow to estimate of individual factor scores AC-scorek and cognitivek. These individual
factor score estimates8 are used in Section 5.4 as noncognitive and cognitive skill measure.
7Results are not driven by Maximum-Likelihood assumptions. Asymptotic distribution free estimation (ADF)
shows qualitatively similar results. ADF provides justifiable point estimates and standard errors under
nonnormality of latent factors and/or indicator variables. But, if latent factors can be assumed to be normally
distributed, ML is more efficient.
8STATA use a calculation analogue to regression scoring. As seen in Table 5.A1, few observations of item
variables are missing in the sample. In this cases, STATA conditions on items with observed values only.
85
5 Unemployment and personality
Factor loadings and fit statistics for 2005, 2009 und 2013 can be seen in Table 5.A2 in the
Appendix. This estimation is not restricted to our main sample, but includes all available
observations to increase model fit. The sample is restricted afterwards. All factor loadings
are statistically significant on the 1% level. Estimated coefficients show that the factor AC-
score is - as assumed - positively correlated with all indicator variables. Thus, higher level
in conscientiousness and agreeableness indicate higher values of AC-score. Size of factor
loadings are all in all acceptable and indicate, that a higher share of variation in the dimension
of conscientiousness is explained by the factor AC-score than of agreeableness9.
The global fit statistics suggest that the model specification is good. The Standardized Root
Mean Square Residual (SRMR) is a goodness-of-fit index which is independent from sample
size and robust against voilation of the assumption of multinomial distribution. A value of
SRMR less or equal than 0.08 indicates good model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). As can be
seen in Table 5.A2 in the Appendix values of SRMR range from 0.051 in 2005 and 2013 and
0.052 in 2009. The Root-Mean-Square-Error of Approxiamtion (RMSEA) is a statistical-
inferences-index which is constructed to avoid common problems of the Chi-Squared-Test.
Values of RMSEA ≥ 0.08 and RMSEA < 0.1 indicates an acceptable model fit. Table 5.A2
in the Appendix show that values range from 0.082 in 2013 and 0.087 in 2005. But in all
specifications pclose = 0.000 apllies. This suggests that H0 : RMSEA≤ 0.05 should not be
rejected, which implies a good model fit (Browne et al., 1993).
Results of individual factor score estimations for AC-score are presented as box plots in Fig-
ure 5.1. Factor scores are estimated as deviations from the mean (of factor scores). Thus,
they are a relative representation and it is not recommendable to interpret them quantitatively.
What we can say is, that highly positive factor scores imply strinking above average com-
bined value of agreeableness and conscientiousness, and that highly negative factor scores
imply strinking below average combined value of agreeableness and conscientiousness.
Median factor scores are about 0.02 for all three years. Remember that values of personality
indicator variables were standardized. As shown in Table 5.A1, the mean value of the sample
is close to zero (about 0.002). The upper and the lower hinge (75th percentile and 25th
percentile) range from about 0.25 to −0.20. A bit more variation is in upper and lower
adjacent values which draw the border between inside and outside values. But in all three
years there are just outside values at the lower end of the personality factor score distribution.
This means, that there are no respondents with extraordinary high level of agreeableness and
9To evaluate whether concientiousness or agreeableness is the driving factor, we would prefer a regression
including three factors - cognitive skill, conscientiousness, and agreeableness - into one regression. But, it
is techniqually not feasible to estimate three orthogonal factors and get an acceptable model fit. Thus, this
weakness has to be accepted.
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conscientiousness but some respondents with extraordinary low level.
Figure 5.1: Boxplots for AC-score.
There are no statistically significant mean-level change in factor scores of personality be-
tween 2005, 2009, and 2013. This conforms with Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2012), who
show that Big Five personality traits are stable for working age adults.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Personality and unemployment spells
Figure 5.2 shows box plots of years spent in unemployment over the life cycle. The median
values are zero for all three years. The 75th percentiles are about 1. This means, that 75
percent of respondents were unemployed for about one year or less up to the responding
time period. Upper adjacent values are about 3 years. Outside values range from this lines
up to 23 in 2005, 28.3 in 2009, and 29.3 in 2013. This means, that there are some respondents
with extraordinarily high spells of unemployment over the life cycle.
The question is, whether or not these extraordinarily high spells of unemployment are related
to the striking low levels of agreeableness and conscientiousness outlier show in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.2: Boxplots for labor market experience unemployed.
This would suggest that are relationship between unemployment and personality exists.
As explained in Section 5.3.1, using total spell of unemployment as dependent variable for
answering this question is inappropriate, because it is highly autocorrelated. If we regress
spell of unemployment in 2013 on spell of unemployment in 2009 we get a coefficient of
determination of R2 = 0.96. In such a specification it is difficult to estimate the relationship
to determinants other than the lagged dependent variable.
This is why we use the first difference of spell of unemployment as dependent and lagged
dependent variable. For personality we use the AC-scores from 2009, because this should be
the basis for behavior between 2009 and 2013.
Figure 5.3 gives an idea of how our dependent variable looks like. Respondents were grouped
into five categories. Category 0 includes all who were not unemployed between 2009 and
2013. Category 1 includes respondents who were unemployed for one year or less in this
time span. Category 2 covers respondents who were unemployed for more than one year,
but not longer than two years. Category 3 covers respondents who were unemployed for
more than two years, but not longer than three years. And category 4 covers respondents
who were unemployed for more than three years, but not longer than four years. About 85
percent of our sample were not unemployed between 2009 and 2013, about 7 percent belong
to category 1, about 3 percent belong to category 2, about 1.5 percent belong to category 3,
and about 3 percent were unemployed for more than 3 years but not longer than 4 years.
To test whether there is an associaiton between unemployment duration and personality sim-
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Figure 5.3: Unemployment between 2009 and 2013. Upper limit of years in unemployment
on the x-axis.
ple OLS regression were run on the following equation:
∆unemploymentk,(13−09) = β0+β1 ·∆unemploymentk,(09−05)+β2 ·AC-scorek,09 (5.10)
+β3 · cognitivek,09+β4 ·Xk,09+µk,(13−09) (5.11)
Control variables Xk,t are sex, age, age2, f amily status, german, and state. For region of res-
idence (state) is controlled for to capture institutional differences - like different unemploy-
ment rates - in German states. To capture different entitlements for benefits it is controlled
for f amily status and german citizenship (german).
It is also standard to control for socio-economic status of parents and income. I refrain from
doing that here. First, parents socio-economic status is one of the main driving factors of
an individual’s cognitive and noncognitive skills (Perkins, 2016). Second, income is highly
correlated with the factor cognitive.
Table 5.1 presents results for the full sample. In column (1) AC-score has the assumed
negative relationship to the change of time spend unemployed, which is highly statistically
significant. Higher values of AC-score indicate higher level of agreeableness and conscien-
tiousness. Respondents with low level of agreeableness and conscientiousness spend - on
average - more time in unemployment.
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Unemployment duration between 2009 and 2013 is - as expected - also negatively correlated
with the factor cognitive.
Because of the use of factors we refrain from intepreting effect sizes quantitatively. But the
pattern of coefficient sizes suggests that the association between unemployment duration and
personality is relevant.
Men have on average higher unemployment durations than women. Unemployment duration
firstly decreases in age but this effect diminishes over time. Married individuals living with
their spouse have lower unemployment durations than divorced, unmarried or single indi-
viduals. German citizenship is not statistically significantly associated with unemployment
duration. The region of residence seems not to be that important.
To explore potential heterogeneity of effects columns (2) and (3) split the sample into women
and men. There are no indications for heterogenous effects. All in all, results do not change
qualitatively, just the coefficient of state of residence lose statistical significance.
Because of the high share of individuals who never have been unemployed, the analysis is
also restricted to individuals who experienced unemployed, yet. Table 5.A3 in the Appendix
reports results for these respondents. Again, specifications in columns (2) and (3) split the
sample into women and men.
Here, results suggest that AC-score is more important for women than for men. The co-
efficient is not only somewhat higher, the association between unemployment duration and
personality is merely statistically significant in the female subsample10.
5.4.2 Personality and unemployment benefits
Now, it should be investigated whether individuals scoring low in concientiousness and
agreeableness have a higher probability of being welfare recipients.
In 2013, about 4 percent of the sample received unemployment benefits11. Figure 5.4 shows
box plots of AC-score by subgroups ‘no welfare recipient in 2013’ and ‘welfare recipient
in 2013’. Mean values of AC-score vary from 0.004 for ‘no welfare recipients in 2013’
to −0.043 for ‘welfare recipients in 2013’. This and the comparison of box plots suggest,
10In a subgroup analysis Fletcher (2013) also just find statistically significant effects of C and A in the female
subsample. In contrast, Egan et al. (2017) and Cuesta and Budría (2017) find no differences between men
and women.
11Strictly speaking, the term unemployment benefits means Arbeitslosengeld II (also called Hartz IV). See
footnote 6 for an explanation of the German system of social assistance
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Table 5.1: Personality and spell of unemployment between 2009 and 2013
(1) (2) (3)
full female male
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
∆unemployment(09−05) 0.637*** (0.009) 0.585*** (0.011) 0.714*** (0.013)
AC-score09 -0.058*** (0.020) -0.062** (0.027) -0.055* (0.028)
cognitive09 -0.060*** (0.013) -0.064*** (0.018) -0.054*** (0.018)
men 0.040*** (0.013)
age -0.018*** (0.007) -0.013 (0.009) -0.019* (0.010)
age2 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000** (0.000)
f amily status 0.025*** (0.006) 0.022*** (0.007) 0.036*** (0.009)
german 0.007 (0.030) -0.005 (0.040) 0.030 (0.046)
state 0.003** (0.001) 0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)
constant 0.354** (0.161) 0.344 (0.218) 0.260 (0.237)
N 5,163 2,825 2,338
R2 0.549 0.524 0.592
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p < 0.01, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗: p < 0.1
Dependent variable: Spell of unemployment between 2009 and 2013.
that the distribution of individual factor scores of AC-score are more skewed to the right for
individuals who receive unemployment benefits than for individuals which do not receive
unemployment benefits in 2013. The dependent variable ALGIIk,t is equal to one if individual
k receives unemployment benefits in period t, and zero otherwise.
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Figure 5.4: Boxplots of AC-scores for individuals who do and do not receive unemployment
benefits in 2013.
To test whether there is a statistically significant association between the probability of
receiving unemployment benefits and AC-score, probit regressions were run on following
equation:
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ALGIIk,13 = β0+β1 ·ALGIIk,05+β2 ·AC-scorek,09
+β3 · cognitivek,09+β4 ·Xk,13+µk,13
As with unemployment duration, the probability of being a welfare benefit recipient is also
path dependent. Therefore, its lag is included into regression. Control variables Xk,2013 are
the same as in the previous section. Welfare recipient status today is caused by behavioral
patterns showed in the (recent) past. Intuitively, it is more convincing, that this behavioral
patterns are grounded on personality traits exhibited in the (recent) past. Therefore, we
include lagged individual factor scores into regressions12.
Table 5.2 shows marginal effects. As in the previous section, column (1) refers to the overall
sample and columns (2) and (3) split the sample into female and male. Results for the overall
sample show a highly statistically significant negative association between the probability of
receiving welfare benefits and personality. This means, that individuals with higher level in
conscientiousness and agreeableness have a lower risk of welfare recipient status. Cognitive
skills are also negatively correlated with the probability of welfare recipient status. Signs of
socio-economic controls are similar to results shown in Section 5.4.1.
Table 5.2: Personality and probability of receiving unemployment benefits in 2013
(1) (2) (3)
full female male
Mfx. Std. Err. Mfx. Std. Err. Mfx. Std. Err.
ALGII05 0.236*** (0.032) 0.201*** (0.038) 0.293*** (0.055)
AC-score09 -0.011*** (0.004) -0.013** (0.005) -0.008 (0.006)
cognitive09 -0.028*** (0.004) -0.032*** (0.005) -0.023*** (0.005)
men -0.000 (0.003)
age -0.003** (0.001) -0.00** (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
age2 0.000** (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
f amily status 0.008*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002)
german -0.002 (0.006) -0.002 (0.007) -0.001 (0.01)
state 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
N 5,163 2,825 2,338
Pseudo R2 0.325 0.327 0.342
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p < 0.01, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗: p < 0.1
Dependent variable: Indicator variable for receiving unemployment benefits in 2013.
Again, results refering to AC-score seem to be driven by the female subsample, as can be
seen in columns (2) and (3) of Table 5.2.
12It is also standard in the personality literature to use personality traits measured prior to the predicted out-
comes to adress the potential reverse causality problem Heckman et al. (2006).
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5.4.3 Personality and on-and-off welfare recipients
The probability and duration of unemployment might not be the only outcomes influenced
by low levels of conscientiousness and agreeableness. Results of Egan et al. (2017) suggest
that a low level of conscientiousness matters for job keeping. Perkins (2016) offer (rather
anecdotical) evidence that individuals with a low level of both concientiousness and agree-
ableness have difficulties to keep their job. In this section we evaluate whether there is an
association between AC-score and the number of status changes between employment and
unemployment.
The G-SOEP asks respondents about their employment status13 on a yearly base. We con-
struct a variable which counts all status changes between 1984 and 2013. To achieve inter-
individual comparability we divided an individual’s total number of status changes by the
number of years she is included in the G-SOEP. If there is a missing value for employment
status the year is skipped (it is also not accounted in the total number of observations for
the specific respondent). For simplicity, this normalized variable is called number of sta-
tus changes in the following. Because of the yearly base the number of status changes is
underestimated.
About 70 percent of the sample experienced no status change between 1984 and 2013. In
2013, the mean of the whole sample is 0.050 status changes with a standard deviation of
0.097. The distribution of status changes experienced by respondents with values of status
changes greater than zero can be seen in Figure 5.5.
With a mean of 0.167, a median of 0.143, and a maximum value of 0.750 this distribution is
skewed to the right. Most individuals exhibit relatively low numbers of status changes, while
there are some individuals with strinkingly large values.
To find out whether there is an association between the extraordinarily high values in status
changes and extraordinarily low individual factor scores of AC-score (see Figure 5.1) OLS
regressions were run on following equation:
Num. of status changesk,13 = β0+β1 ·Num. of status changesk,05+β2 ·AC-scorek,09
+β3 · cognitivek,09+β4 ·Xk,13+µk,13
13It is asked whether an individual is employed or unemployed. There is no differentiation between Arbeit-
slosengeld I and II.
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of status changes experienced by respondents with more than zero
status changes (in 2013).
As the dependent variable number of status changes is autocorrelated by construction its
lag has to be included into regression. Control variables Xk,13 and individual factor scores
AC-score and cognitive are the same as in the previous subsection.
Table 5.3 presents results. Again, column (1) refers to the whole sample and columns (2)
and (3) refer to women and men, respectively. As can be seen in column (1) signs and
significance of socio-economic control variables are as before. There is also a statistically
significant, negative correlation between AC-score and number of status changes. Cogni-
tive skills and number of status changes are statistically significantly correlated, too, and
the coefficient has the expected negative sign. Up to this point no surprises: individuals
with higher noncognitive and cognitive skills - on average - exhibit lower numbers of status
changes, thus, have lower probabilties to be on and off welfare recipients.
But there is a surprise in columns (2) and (3). This time, the negative correlation between
AC-score and the dependent variable is statistically significant for men only.
Results suggests that personality is an important determinant of women’s risk of unemploy-
ment and unemployment duration, but for men personality is more a matter of job keeping.
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Table 5.3: Personality and on-and-off welfare recipients
(1) (2) (3)
full female male
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Num. of status changes05 1.272*** (0.015) 1.267*** (0.020) 1.279*** (0.022)
AC-score09 -0.006** (0.003) -0.004 (0.004) -0.009** (0.004)
cognitive09 -0.012*** (0.002) -0.011*** (0.002) -0.014*** (0.002)
men -0.001 (0.002)
age -0.011*** (0.001) -0.011*** (0.001) -0.011*** (0.001)
age2 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)
f amily status 0.004*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001)
german 0.001 (0.004) 0.005 (0.005) -0.006 (0.006)
state 0.000** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
constant 0.283*** (0.020) 0.274*** (0.029) 0.289*** (0.029)
N 5,163 2,825 2,338
R2 0.618 0.607 0.634
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p < 0.01, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗: p < 0.1
Dependent variable: Sum of unemployment status changes in 2013 (change is measured on a yearly base).
5.5 Conclusions
Our results suggest that personality and unemployment are associated. Individuals with low
levels of concientiousness and agreeableness have a higher risk of being welfare recipients,
have longer unemployment durations, and change more frequently between employment and
unemployment as more conscientious and agreeable individuals.
The association between receiving unemployment benefits and AC-score seems to be more
important for women. In contrast, the association between AC-score and on-and-off welfare
recipient status seems to be more important for men.
It would also be interesting to investigate the association between AC-score and attitudinal
variables towards the welfare state. This would disentangle two possible pathways. First, it
might be possible that low AC-score individuals have to exert more effort to find and keep
a job. But secondly, it might also be possible that low AC-score individuals have a lower
intrinsic motivation to find and keep a job because they think it is not necessary to live on
their own expense. Unfortunately, the G-SOEP does not contain attended questions for such
an analysis.
That we find a statistically significant correlation between personality and unemployment
contributes to an socially controversial debate. The idea that welfare recipients differ in
personality deepens ideological divides and leads to stigmatization of welfare recipients.
Thus, we think it is important to remember that we just found an correlation. We cannot say
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anything about reasons and consequences.
Our results adds findings that low scorers in agreeableness and conscientiousness have a
higher risk of being welfare recipients. Perkins (2016) even goes one step further. He claims
in his ‘Welfare Trait Theory’ that the low AC-score parents raise low AC-score children and
that this - in combination with head-dependent welfare benefits - might initiate a hazardous
welfare state dynamic similar to that proposed by Lindbeck et al. (1999). That requires a
transmission of the AC-score from parents to their children and a replicator dynamic change
initiated by the rise of the welfare state. That would lead to an increasing proportion of
welfare recipients in the long run.
The literature shows that personality traits indeed evolve in early childhood and are rela-
tively constant over the life cycle (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2012; Roberts, 2009). Thus,
noncognitive skills are formed by childhood home and environment, where parents play an
important role (Heckman et al., 2006). But - the good news is - empirical literature and eval-
uations of early cildhood intervention programs (like the Perry Preschool Program and the
STAR Project) also show that it is possible to suppport children to develop reasonable levels
of conscientiuoness and agreeableness
Results of this paper suggest that an association between unemployment and personality
exists. Everything else is subject to future research.
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5.6 Appendix
Table 5.A1: Descriptive statistics for 2013
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
a_1: Am sometimes too
coarse with others 4.882 (1.618) 1† 7‡ 5,140
a_2: Able to forgive 5.375 (1.318) 1‡ 7† 5,146
a_3: Friendly with others 5.781 (1.058) 1‡ 7† 5,140
c_1: Thorough worker 6.235 (0.933) 1‡ 7† 5,151
c_2: Tend to be lazy 5.635 (1.517) 1† 7‡ 5,136
c_3: Carry out tasks efficiently 5.863 (1.033) 1‡ 7† 5,140
educ_s1 4.191 (1.240) 1 6 5,104
educ_w2 2.304 (0.825) 1 4 5,163
status3 2.688 (1.061) 1 5 5,101
AC-score (factor score) 0.002 (0.326) -1.650 0.502 5,163
cognitive (factor score) 0.002 (0.540) -1.323 1.175 5,163
unemployment spell 1.217 (2.808) 0 29.3 5,163
∆unemployment(13−09) 0.212 (0.703) 0 3.9 5,163
ALGII 0.041 (0.198) 0 1 5,163
Num. of status changes 0.050 (0.097) 0 0.750 5,163
men 0.453 (0.498) 0 1 5,163
age 49.4 (9.3) 25 65 5,163
f amily status 1.710 (1.200) 1 7 5,163
german 0.947 (0.225) 0 1 5,163
Source: G-SOEP.
† agree strongly
‡ disagree strongly
1 (6) higher secondary education (Abitur), (5) higher secondary education (Fachhochschulreife), (4) secondary ed-
ucation, (3) lower secondary education, (2) other , (1) primary education.
2 (1) no professional training, (2) professional training, (3) applied science university diploma, (4) University de-
gree/PhD
3 (1) non-working , (2) blue-collar worker, (3) white-collar worker, (4) self-employed, (5) public servants
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Table 5.A2: Estimated coefficients of the cognitive and noncognitive factors
2005 2009 2013
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
educ_w
cognitive 0.772*** 0.009 0.763*** 0.009 0.754*** 0.1
constant 2.664*** 0.02 2.674*** 0.02 2.681*** 0.021
educ_s
cognitive 0.742*** 0.009 0.749*** 0.009 0.779*** 0.01
constant 3.158*** 0.023 3.223*** 0.023 3.220*** 0.024
status
cognitive 0.479*** 0.009 0.482*** 0.009 0.449*** 0.01
constant 2.377*** 0.019 2.481*** 0.019 2.509*** 0.02
c_1
AC-score 0.659*** 0.009 0.650*** 0.009 0.659*** 0.009
constant 6.961*** 0.048 6.515*** 0.045 6.642*** 0.047
c_2
AC-score 0.493*** 0.01 0.433*** 0.01 0.414*** 0.011
constant 4.028*** 0.029 3.625*** 0.026 3.555*** 0.027
c_3
AC-score 0.648*** 0.009 0.661*** 0.009 0.677*** 0.009
constant 5.714*** 0.04 5.430*** 0.037 5.775*** 0.041
a_1
AC-score 0.268*** 0.012 0.253*** 0.012 0.236*** 0.012
constant 3.062*** 0.023 2.989*** 0.022 2.976*** 0.023
a_2
AC-score 0.328*** 0.011 0.291*** 0.011 0.272*** 0.012
constant 4.249*** 0.03 3.986*** 0.028 4.101*** 0.03
a_3
AC-score 0.501*** 0.01 0.448*** 0.011 0.463*** 0.011
constant 5.347*** 0.01 5.094*** 0.035 5.621*** 0.04
N 11,012 11,210 10,361
log likelihood -147809.51 -153615.65 -140581.61
R2 0.925 0.92 0.925
SRMR 0.051 0.052 0.051
RMSEA 0.087 0.086 0.082
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Table 5.A3: Personality and spell of unemployment between 2009 and 2013 - subsample of
individuals who experienced unemployment
(1) (2) (3)
full female male
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
∆unemployment(09−05) 0.601*** (0.014) 0.556*** (0.018) 0.666*** (0.022)
AC-score09 -0.104** (0.042) -0.104* (0.054) -0.098 (0.063)
cognitive09 -0.116*** (0.030) -0.131*** (0.040) -0.105** (0.046)
men 0.089*** (0.029)
age -0.041*** (0.014) -0.023 (0.018) -0.061*** (0.022)
age2 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
f amily status 0.048*** (0.012) 0.040*** (0.015) 0.077*** (0.019)
german 0.007 (0.061) -0.004 (0.080) 0.040 (0.091)
state 0.005 (0.003) 0.005 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005)
constant 0.803** (0.341) 0.597 (0.439) 1.009* (0.530)
N 2,353 1,342 1,011
R2 0.505 0.479 0.553
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p < 0.01, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗: p < 0.1
Dependent variable: Spell of unemployment between 2009 and 2013.
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Theoretical correlation matrix
In this Section the theoretical correlation matrix used for the estimation of the latent factor
structure model is derived. Explanations are on the basis of Backhaus et al. (2015), see
Brown (2014) for an introduction into confirmatory analysis. The measurement model for
standardized indicator variables14 xik with i = 1, ...,9 and k individuals, and factors f1 =
cognitive and f2 =AC-score looks as follows:
x1k = λ11 · f1k + ε1k (5.12)
x2k = λ21 · f1k + ε2k (5.13)
x3k = λ31 · f1k + ε3k (5.14)
x4k = λ42 · f2k + ε4k (5.15)
x5k = λ52 · f2k + ε5k (5.16)
x6k = λ62 · f2k + ε6k (5.17)
x7k = λ72 · f2k + ε7k (5.18)
x8k = λ82 · f2k + ε8k (5.19)
x9k = λ92 · f2k + ε9k (5.20)
For the theoretical correlation matrix we correlate every indicator variable against every
other.
rxi,x j =
1
K∑k
xik · x jk (5.21)
where i = 1, ...,9 and j = 1, ...,9.
There are three cases which might arise:
1. an indicator variable is correlated against itself (i = j),
2. two different indicator variables were correlated but both depend on the same factor
(i 6= j),
3. two different indicator variables were correlated which do not depend on the same
factor (i 6= j).
14x1k =
educ_w1k−educ_w
sdeduc_w
100
5 Unemployment and personality
The covariances of the factors are defined as Cov( f1, f1) =Φ f1, f1 = 1, Cov( f2, f2) =Φ f2, f2 =
1, and Cov( f1, f2) =Φ f1, f2 = 0.
Inserting equations (5.12) to (5.20) into equation (5.21) and assuming that disturbance terms
are not correlated, and that factors and disturbance terms are uncorrelated, too, yields:
for case (i):
rxi,xi =
1
K∑k
(λi1 f1k + εik)(λi1 f1k + εik)
=
1
K∑k
[(λi1 · f1k ·λi1 · f1k)+(λi1 · f1k · εik)+(εik ·λi1 · f1k)+(εik · εik)]
= λi1 ·λi1 · 1K∑k
f1k · f1k +λi1 · 1K∑k
f1k · εik +λi1 · 1K∑k
εik · f1k + 1K∑k
εik · εik
= λi1 ·λi1 ·Φ f1, f1 +λi1 · r f1,εi +λi1 · rεi, f1 + rεi,εi.
= λ 2i1+ ε
2
i
for case (ii):
rxi,x j =
1
K∑k
(λi1 f1k + εik)(λ j1 f1k + ε jk)
...
= λi1 ·λ j1 ·Φ f1, f1 +λi1 · r f1,ε j +λ j1 · rεi, f1 + rεi,ε j .
= λi1 ·λ j1
and for case (iii):
rxi,x j =
1
K∑k
(λi1 f1k + εik)(λ j2 f2k + ε jk)
...
= λi1 ·λ j2 ·Φ f1, f2 +λi1 · r f1,ε j +λ j2 · rεi, f2 + rεi,ε j .
= 0
This leads to the theoretical correlation matrix ∑ˆ:
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ˆ∑=

λ 211+ ε
2
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
λ11λ21 λ 221+ ε
2
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
λ11λ31 λ21λ31 λ 231+ ε
2
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 λ 242+ ε
2
4 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 λ42λ52 λ 252+ ε
2
5 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 λ42λ62 λ52λ62 λ 262+ ε
2
6 0 0 0
0 0 0 λ42λ72 λ52λ72 λ62λ72 λ 272+ ε
2
7 0 0
0 0 0 λ42λ82 λ52λ82 λ62λ82 λ72λ82 λ 282+ ε
2
8 0
λ11λ92Φ f1, f2 = 0 0 0 λ42λ92 λ52λ92 λ62λ92 λ72λ92 λ82λ92 λ
2
92+ ε
2
9

Parameters are estimated to minimize the discrepancy function which is between ∑ˆ and the
empirical correlation matrix.
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